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Abstract
Smart Resource Sharing for Concurrency and Security
Ying Gao
Diﬀerent layers of the computer system, from the low-level hardware accelera-
tors and networks-on-chip (NoC) in multi-core systems, to the upper-level operat-
ing systems and software applications, rely on the sharing of hardware computing
resources. Unfortunately such sharing, when not carefully managed, can introduce
a host of protection problems and sources of information leakage. We describe a
set of methods by which it is possible to systematically scale performance via
hardware sharing without exacerbating security properties by being aware of the
design and characteristics of individual layers and components. The key to this is
eﬃciently dealing with security vulnerabilities introduced by sharing in terms of
time and space through the creation of new security-conscious sharing interfaces.
In a systematic way is to ﬁrst deﬁne coordination techniques into more detailed
patterns, and by bridging the gap of less eﬃcient universal measures with provably
more performant and secure patterns.
Speciﬁcally we demonstrate the usefulness of a sharing pattern for hardware
and software systems where separation is of concern (interference and timing chan-
nel mitigation, etc). The most important insight is that in order to fully utilize
vi
computing resources (to improve performance and availability), the entities that
share these resources must coordinate in a pre-calculated way. More dynamic
approaches to improve performance and concurrency are likely to introduce new
interference in the system. While we show that certain static scheduling measures
in lower level hardware such as networks-on-chip can provably eliminate timing
channels, the dynamic nature of software systems makes covert channels harder
to be conﬁned. Besides, software systems also face other types of security prob-
lems beyond side channels. To improve concurrency and performance without
exacerbating security requires a slightly diﬀerent approach.
To study the obstacles that hinder software applications’ scaling in a sys-
tem because of security concerns, we delve into the Android operating system
and its appiﬁcation ecosystem structure. A prime avenue for attack is intro-
duced because of its distributed sharing eco-pattern. We propose a centralized
approach with a single reliable service as a method to enable computation reuse
among applications. The proposed centralization technique favors well-protected
application-to-system communications over vulnerable application-to-application
communications. Thus not only computation concurrency is boosted but also the
possibility of an app being attacked through the attack-prone Inter-Component
Calls (ICCs) due to possible distributed computation sharing is eliminated. This
approach further enables improvements to security with the addition of a novel
vii
application-centric grouping for isolation. We show through a prototype on An-
droid how our approach supports and protects inter-app resource sharing, while
improving concurrency at scale.
viii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The dissertation presents a step towards a more systematic design methodology
by which one can construct scalable components sharing across hardware software
boundaries. The need to bridging the gap between the diverse heterogeneous hard-
ware landscape envisioned by many as the future, and the designed-for-single-core
simple software operating systems is acute. From the hardware perspective, as we
entered the multi-core and manycore era, communications and sharing eﬃciency
among cores has become one of the biggest obstacles to eﬃciency. From the oper-
ating systems perspective, managing the emerging accelerator architectures and
scheduling the complex software that multiplex their resources them becomes a
signiﬁcant new burden. The problem is especially acute in mobile platforms where
1
the computing resources are diverse, energy is limited, and the demand for new
features is ever present.
While scheduling for performance alone is hard enough, when coupled with
security concerns, the burden is even higher. All sharing comes with the risk of
information leaking. If the shared state is not managed correctly it is possible for
two diﬀerent subsystems to learn about each others’ actions. A malicious soft-
ware could gain useful information about a victim when conﬂicts in the resources
appear. Two more malicious subsystems might even purposefully communicate
through such resource contention by forming a covert channel. The classic Denial-
of-Service (DoS) attack is another example of how the system can be broken down
by improper sharing schemes. Of course these speciﬁc scenarios are just a tip of
the iceberg of the attacks enabled by systems engineered without a mind to secure
sharing. Due to the creativity of attackers and the lack of established fail-proof
designs, a large body of work exists focused on vulnerability and malware studies
across all system layers.
Designs that attempt to balance security and performance in the context of the
coordinating hardware/software subsystems is the topic of this thesis. It is diﬃcult
to solve performance and security problems at the same time, or at least to enhance
one without hurting another. However, we show in this thesis a set of three
patterns for managing the above attack scenarios while maintaining performance,
2
two in hardware-level (networks-on-chip and accelerators) and one in software
system level (Android mobile OS). We show how careful interface design coupled
with proposed coordination patterns can dramatically boost system performance
and concurrency by eﬃcient sharing without compromising the original system’s
security properties.
Before we dive into the details of either of the scenarios, we begin with some
background on the growing demand for isolation inside hardware units and among
applications in the operating systems.
1.1 Non-Interference and Domain Isolation
In high-assurance systems it is a common practice to break the system into a
set of domains, which are to be kept separate. These domains should have no eﬀect
on one another. For example, the Mars Curiosity rover software runs on a RAD750
processor, a single-core radiation-hardened version of the Power architecture with
a special-purpose separation kernel[1]. The kernel partitions the tasks, such as
guidance, navigation and the various science packages from one another to help
prevent cascading failures. Future space missions are looking to use multicore
systems[2][84], which adds another layer of communication, but there are serious
concerns about the introduction of opportunities for interference between system
components[68]. The problem is that typical networks-on-chip have many internal
3
resources that are shared between packets from diﬀerent domains, which we would
otherwise wish to keep separate. Such resource contention introduces interference
between these diﬀerent domains, which can create a performance impact on some
ﬂows, pose a security threat by creating an opportunity for timing channels, and
generally complicates the ﬁnal veriﬁcation and certiﬁcation process of the system
because all of the ways in which that interaction might occur must be accounted
for. Non-interference means that injection of packets from one domain cannot
aﬀect in any way (including the timing of delivery of) packets from other domains.
Similarly, in operating systems such resource contention also exist among ap-
plications. The problem is even more acute in mobile operating systems where a
lot of resources are from I/O devices (usually only one for each type) and often
request real-time processing. To prevent such contention and to keep strict iso-
lation, many mobile systems are designed to allow only one application to access
the device at a time. However, this is in direct conﬂict with the current need of
running concurrent applications both foreground and background. For example, a
user might use voice command to order food by speech recognition (SR) featured
restaurant apps meanwhile discussing with friends on social apps using audio,
she/he might also require the help of a SR supported search assistant app as well.
In the newest release Android Nougat (2016), the split screen feature is the ﬁrst
time Android will allow the convenience of running multiple applications in the
4
foreground. To bring isolation into the OS that requires application concurrency
is not an easy task, under limited hardware computing resources and energy, it
becomes even more diﬃcult when we talk about scalability.
1.2 Thesis Statement and Dissertation Roadmap
I propose that under coordinated domain-aware sharing schemes, in almost all
system layers, it is possible to increase concurrency and scalability while main-
taining useful security properties (e.g. isolation). I demonstrate this observation
through its application in low-level networks-on-chip, hardware accelerators, and
higher-level operating systems and applications. The rest of this chapter pro-
vides an overview of our proposed steps towards a system that provides superior
concurrency without exacerbating isolation properties.
1.2.1 Networks-on-Chip with Provable Security Proper-
ties
One simple way to ensure separation within a networks-on-chip is to simply
time multiplex the network. Each “domain” gets it’s turn across the entire network
at a time. However, this approach introduces huge latencies and simple ways of
relaxing TDMA introduce inter-domain interference. In replacing the non-scalable
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TDMA approach, we propose a technique that assures multi-way non-interference
in NoCs with low overhead on latency to allow for veriﬁcation of high assur-
ance systems such as those in aerospace and automotive systems. By carefully
scheduling the network into waves that ﬂow across the interconnect, data from
diﬀerent domains carried by these waves are strictly non-interfering while avoiding
the signiﬁcant overheads associated with cycle-by-cycle time multiplexing. The
technique, named SurfNoC, signiﬁcantly reduces the latency incurred by tempo-
ral partitioning. We describe the scheduling policy and router microarchitecture
changes required, and evaluate the information-ﬂow security of a synthesizable
implementation through gate-level information ﬂow analysis. When comparing
our approach for varying numbers of domains and network sizes, we ﬁnd that in
many cases SurfNoC can dramatically reduce the latency overhead of implement-
ing cycle-level non-interference.
1.2.2 Hardware-Assisted Accelerator Virtualization
In recent years, hardware accelerators are becoming ﬁrst class citizens on chips
because of their usefulness in improving performance and saving power in compu-
tation intensive tasks. However, unlike CPUs that can context switch eﬀortlessly
(without losing intermediate data) through registers and deep pipe-lining, the
options for time multiplex sharing on accelerators are often limited – one either
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drops the current computing task or the requesting app should wait in queue for
the occupying task to ﬁnish. The former usually introduces wasted cycles and the
latter degrades responsiveness.
In order to ﬁx the designed-not-for-share accelerator architectures, we examine
a set of hardware design approaches whereby the interface is split providing two
virtual units. We build a public-key crypto accelerator virtualization and study
the trade-oﬀ between sharing granularity and management overhead in time and
space. Based on observations made during the design of several such systems,
we propose a hybrid local-remote scheduling approach that promotes more intelli-
gent decisions during hardware context switches and enables quick and safe state
packaging. We ﬁnd that performance can vary signiﬁcantly among the examined
approaches, and that our new design, with explicit accelerator support for state
management and a modicum of scheduling ﬂexibility, can allow highly contended
resources to be eﬃciently shared with only moderate gains in area and power con-
sumption. The statically designed separation in interfaces, switching points and
ﬁxed trackable memory are all in support for isolation. The work is also the result
of cooperation within hardware architecture design and software scheduling.
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1.2.3 Application-Centric Access Control and Computa-
tion Concurrency in Mobile Systems
While the previous two sections introduce the smart sharing schemes in hard-
ware designs, when looking into the higher operating system level we ﬁnd that
sharing schemes can also be modiﬁed to enable application concurrency. A typical
example is the Android system where applications would beneﬁt from further com-
munication and sharing. However, due to Android’s appiﬁcation [5] (decentral-
ized) nature (each app has a Linux userID along with server client communication
mechanism among apps) and arguably ﬂawed permission model (permissions are
mostly requested by app on installation and the components within an app share
the same permission), there has been huge number of attacks [15][23] targeting
these vulnerabilities. While research on Android has seen a tremendous amount
of eﬀort towards improving the security and privacy issues[96][94][24][31][88][27],
very few have explored the problem with an eye towards enhancing computation
concurrency and performance.
To discover the obstacles hindering the progress of application concurrency and
performance in Android, we systematically studied the system designs and compo-
nents that are both vulnerability-prone and performance-unfriendly. We make the
key observation that the lack of centralization in Android could be hurting both
security and performance. Inspired by the PeerReview[36] concept in distributed
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systems community, we propose a central platform to guide interested apps in
forming groups for sharing on diﬀerent I/O libraries and computations. By re-
fraining the communication paths among collaboration-speciﬁed apps, server app
side security concerns can be relieved, thus promoting conﬁdence and an improved
willingness to share. Besides, the attack-prone inter-app communications are re-
placed by app-to-central service communications, the client app should be less
worried in being attacked during sharing. For computation heavy library sharing,
the central platform employs computation memorization to record library func-
tion call chains from concurrent running apps and dispatch computations with
superior scalability.
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Chapter 2
Networks on Chip with Provable
Security Properties
Programmers are increasingly asked to manage a complex collection of com-
puting elements including a variety of cores, accelerators, and special purpose
functions. While these many-core architectures can be a boon for common case
performance and power-eﬃciency, when an application demands a high degree of
reliability or security the advantages becomes a little less clear. On one hand,
the ability to spatially separate computations means that critical operations can
be physically isolated from malicious or untrustworthy components. There are
many advantages to providing physical separation which have been well explored
in the literature [72, 92]. On the other hand, real systems are likely to use dif-
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ferent subsets of cores and accelerators based on the needs of the application and
thus will require a shared communication network. When a general purpose inter-
connect is used, analyzing all the ways in which an attacker might inﬂuence the
system becomes far more complicated. The problem is hard enough if we restrict
ourselves to considering only average case performance or packet ordering, but
the diﬃculty of the problem increases even further if we attempt to prevent even
cycle-level variations.
In high assurance systems it is common practice to break the system into a set
of domains which are to be kept separate. These domains should have no-eﬀect on
one another. For example, the Mars Curiosity rover software runs on a RAD750
processor, a single-core radiation-hardened version of the Power architecture with
a special purpose separation kernel [1]. The kernel partitions the tasks such as
guidance, navigation and the various science packages from one another to help
prevent cascading failures. Future space missions are looking to use multicore
systems [84, 2] which adds another layer of communication, but there are serious
concerns about the introduction of opportunities for interference between system
components.
The problem is that typical networks-on-chip have many internal resources
that are shared between packets from diﬀerent domains which we would other-
wise wish to keep separate. These resources include the buﬀers holding the pack-
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ets, the crossbar switches, and the individual ports and channels. Such resource
contention introduces “interference” between these diﬀerent domains which can
create a performance impact on some ﬂows, pose a security threat by creating an
opportunity for timing channels [89], and generally complicates the ﬁnal veriﬁca-
tion and certiﬁcation process of the system because all of the ways in which that
interaction might occur must be accounted for.
These concerns are similar to, but distinct from, the problem of providing
quality-of-service guarantees. While QoS can minimize the performance impact
of sharing between domains by providing a minimum guaranteed level of service
for each domain (or class) [32, 33, 50, 34], as shown by Wang and Suh, qual-
ity of service techniques will still allow timing variations and thus do not truly
support non-interference [89]. The only way to be certain that the domains are
non-interfering is to statically schedule the domains on the network over time.
However, a straightforward application of time multiplexing leads to signiﬁcant
increases in latencies as each link in the network is now time multiplexed between
many diﬀerent domains.
The core idea behind our approach is that, if a strictly time multiplexed link
is seen as an oscillating behavior, we can stagger the phases of these oscillations
across the network such that a set of “waves” are created. As these waves traverse
the network they provide an opportunity for packets of the corresponding domain
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to travel unimpeded along with these waves (thus avoiding excessive latency)
while still requiring no dynamic scheduling between domains (thus preventing
timing corruption or information leakage). Channels in the same dimension and
direction appear to “propagate” diﬀerent domains such that after passing through
the pipeline of the router, the channel is ready to forward a packet coming from
the same dimension and domain without any additional wait (unless there is
contention from packets of the same domain). In this way packets “surf” the
waves in each dimension. We identify the many potential hazards non-interference
faces in a modern network-on-chip, we discuss the details and ramiﬁcations of our
surf scheduling methodology, and we argue that our approach truly does not allow
even cycle-level cross-domain interference. Speciﬁcally in this chapter:
1. We present a link scheduling scheme and network router design which si-
multaneously supports both low-latency packet-switched operation and non-
interference between domains.
2. We show that as the network grows in size, as the number of domains in-
creases, and as the asymmetry between domains becomes larger, the beneﬁt
for a surf-scheduled network over TDMA continues to increase.
3. We evaluate the latency, throughput, area, and power consumption of these
approaches through a detailed network simulation.
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4. Finally, we argue that the technique is truly sound through an analysis of
the router micro-architecture and with the help of formal veriﬁcation via
gate-level information ﬂow analysis.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We begin with a discussion
of related work and how our proposed solution ﬁts in the design space in Sec-
tion 2.1. Next, in Section 2.2, we describe the core idea behind the SurfNoC
schedule followed by a detailed router micro-architecture discussion in Section 2.3.
Section 2.4 presents the evaluation of the system and explores the relationship
between domains, partition asymmetry, and scheduling. Then, we provide a gate-
level information-ﬂow analysis in Section 2.5 Finally, Section 2.6 concludes the
paper with our ﬁnal thoughts and a discussion of future directions.
2.1 Related Work
Our proposed solution to non-interference in NoCs touches on many prob-
lems that has been proposed in the literature, such as timing channels in micro
architecture, QoS in network-on-chips, fault-containment and composability in
system-on-chips, and security in NoCs. In this section, we will try to review some
of this related work and show how our work ﬁts in the design space.
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Timing Channels and Non-interference in Micro-architecture There has
been an recent renewed interest in the analysis of timing channel attacks and mit-
igations through micro-architecture state such as cache interference [6, 90, 91]
and branch predictors [7, 8]. One approach to these problems is a technique that
can verify non-interference of hardware/software systems (including high perfor-
mance features such as pipelining and caching) using gate-level information ﬂow
tracking [87, 85, 86]. More recently, a NoC timing channel protection scheme
for a system with security lattices was been proposed [89]. This paper proposes
a priority-based arbitration scheme to allow packets with LOW labels to always
win arbitration (except when they reach a pre-speciﬁed quota during each system
epoch to prevent denial-of-service attacks from the LOW domain). This ensures
that information cannot ﬂow from the domain with HIGH label to the domain
with LOW label, but allows for information ﬂow in the other direction. It can be
extended to multiple security labels as long as they form a lattice. In this work,
we propose a technique that assures multi-way non-interference in NoCs with low
overhead on latency to allow for veriﬁcation of high assurance systems such as
those in aerospace and automotive systems.
QoS in Network-on-chips Techniques for achieving NoC quality-of-service
guarantees have been proposed based on solutions to analogous problems in macro-
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scale networks. These approaches for the most part attempt to limit the rates of
each ﬂow [32, 33, 50, 34]. However, quality-of-service guarantees are known to be
not suﬃcient for timing channel protection [89]. Optimizations that allow ﬂows to
go over their designated rate when uncontended and the lack of fault containment
is problematic for high assurance systems [72] because of the high cost of any
unaccounted variation in such systems. The time division approach proposed
here provides for both fault containment and timing channel elimination.
Security in NoCs Security in NoCs has been studied from several aspects that
focus on speciﬁc attack mitigations such as defending against denial-of-service
(DoS), battery-draining attack [26] and maintaining access control of speciﬁc mem-
ory region in shared memory systems [26, 69], and buﬀer overﬂow attacks [55, 56].
Gebotys and Zhang have focused on conﬁdentiality by providing encryption tech-
niques for data transmitted over the NoC in a SoC setting [28]. Availability is
handled in the Tile64 iMesh networks by separating (and in fact physically sepa-
rating) the network accessible by user applications from the network used by the
OS and IO device traﬃc [92]. Our scheme can protect against DoS and band-
width depletion attacks between domains because of the static time allocation to
diﬀerent domains.
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Non-interference in NoCs Non-interference in network-on-chips has been
studied in the system-on-chip domain to provide composibility and fault contain-
ment as well as time-predictability for real-time performance guarantees [38, 65].
Composibility means that the system can be analyzed as a set of independent
components which allows for easier veriﬁcation of the overall system without hav-
ing to verify all possible interleavings of events in the system. This has been
specially critical in high assurance systems that requires very high level of veriﬁ-
cation because of safety ramiﬁcations of the system. Æthearal proposed a time-
division multiplexed (TDM) virtual circuit switching network to provide guaran-
teed services (GS) for performance critical applications with real-time deadlines
and a packet switched best-eﬀort (BE) network for applications with less require-
ments [29]. A lighter version that only provides GS was proposed to further sim-
plify routers [79, 37]. More recently, Stefan and Goossens proposed a modiﬁcation
on Æthearal that enables multi-path routing both static and dynamic (based on
a true random number generator) in order to enhance the security by using non-
deterministic path instead of source routing used in Æthearal [80]. In addition,
the need for real-time worst case execution time (WCET) analysis inspired a set of
work, such as, the T-CREST project which tries to build a time-predictable multi-
core for real time applications. They proposed a integer programming technique
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to minimize the length of static schedule of all-to-all circuit switching connections
in a TDM way [75].
Regarding packet switching networks, Avici TSR network [21] uses separate
virtual channels for each destination in the network but packets destined to dif-
ferent locations share physical channels. Under saturation, physical channels are
allocated fairly, but destinations can go over their fair share when the network is
not saturated which can leak information by detecting the variation of bandwidth
a certain node receives.
To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the ﬁrst to provide a packet-
switched network that can guarantee two-way (or multi-way) non-interference and
timing channel protection in a way that is both a) provable down to the gate-level
implementation and b) provides low latency overhead.
2.2 SurfNoC Architecture
2.2.1 A Motivating Example
Consider the 16-node half mesh network (channels are drawn in one direction
left-to-right and top-down for illustration purposes) in Figure 2.1, assuming that
even nodes belong to domain 0 and odd nodes are part of domain 1. A straight
forward way to support non-interference is by partitioning the virtual channels and
18
time-multiplexing the physical channels and crossbars between diﬀerent domains
such that channels are only allowed to propagate packets from domain 0 (black)
on even cycles and packets from domain 1 (grey) on odd cycles (assuming a single
cycle routers) as shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.1. This time-multiplexing scheme
ensures that the latency and throughput of each domain is completely independent
of the timing of the other domain’s load. However, this baseline scheme means
that packets will have to wait an extra cycles at each hop. Even worse, as we scale
the number of partitions from 1 to D, assuming a single-cycle router each packet
will have to wait D− 1 cycles per hop. This is an expensive price to pay, and one
that continues to get worse the further away you attempt to communicate. If we
want to hold on to non-interference, we will still need these strict time-varying
partitions, but by changing the phase of their oscillations we can dramatically
reduce the latencies involved.
A better schedule for time-multiplexing will make sure that domains wash over
the network as a wave, such that each dimension appears to be “propagating” one
domain in a pipelined fashion. Figure 2.1 shows a simpliﬁed view of this point.
Every link still rotates evenly through domain 0 and domain 1, but if we consider
the top row in Figure 2.1, we can see alternating channels (grey, black, grey). In
the next cycle (shown in Figure 2.1, the channels used to propagate packets from
domain 0 (black) will carry packets from domain 1 (grey), and vice versa.
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Before entering the network, the packet waits in the injection port until its
domain’s turn. The schedule ensures that when the packet is ready to egress the
router that there will be no delay waiting its domain’s turn at the downstream
router. The only exceptions to this rule are when a packet needs to change di-
mensions (such as when the packet turns from traveling along the X dimension to
the Y dimension) and when there is contention from packets in the same domain.
As an optimization, we constrain our schedule such that two directions of the
router propagate packets from the same domain at the same time. For example,
the top-left router in Figure 2.1 propagates packets from domain 0 (black) both
to the right and down. In this case, any packet which is sent in a downward
and/or rightward direction will only have to wait to enter the network and will
have no additional waits during turns between dimensions (again, unless there is
intra-domain contention). Of course this example is very simple as it has only two
domains, even divisions, and does not consider the latency of the network routers.
In the next section, we will show how to devise detailed strategy for k-ary n-cube
meshes and tori networks and discuss how non-interference can be shown at the
level of an implementation..
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2.2.2 SurfNoC Scheduling
The most basic routing algorithm in meshes and tori is dimension-ordered
routing. That is, a packet walks through a dimension until it cannot move further
without going farther from the destination and then transfers to an other dimen-
sion. Thus, routing is linear in each dimension which provides an opportunity to
reduce wait time between hops. This way packets will only have to wait when they
enter the network from the injection channel and when they change dimensions.
We will describe this idea in details in the rest of this section.
The straightforward way to support time-division multiplexing is to operate
the whole network in time slices that are divided between application domains.
That is a packet waits at each hop until the network is forwarding packets from
that its domain. This approach leads to a zero-load latency L0 that is proportional
to the number of application domains D, pipeline depth P , and the number of
hops H, as shown in Equation 2.1. This solution might work eﬃciently for a small
number of domains such as 2 to 4 domains but in high assurance applications as
many as tens of domains can be found [72].
L0 = HP (D − 1) (2.1)
Building on the technique we developed in the motivating example, we propose
SurfNoC scheduling in which diﬀerent routers (and in fact diﬀerent ports of the
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same router) can forward packets from diﬀerent domains at the same cycle. In
this schedule, a packet waits until it can be forwarded in one dimension (i.e. its
output channel is forwarding packets from its domain at this cycle) and then does
not experience any wait at any downstream router in this dimension (assuming
there is no contention from packets from the same domain) in a way similar to the
schedule developed in the half-mesh example. After ﬁnishing the ﬁrst dimension,
the packet may experience another wait until it can be forwarded on the next
dimension. We call this schedule Surf scheduling because a packet is like a surfer
who waits to “ride” a wave until some location and then waits to “ride” another
wave. In this analogy, waves are dimension pipelines. Equation 2.2 shows that
maximum zero-load latency and clearly shows that the overhead is additive not
multiplicative as in the straightforward way. The term (n − 1 + 2) comes from
n−1 transitions between dimensions and 2 waits during injection and ejection. It
is worth noting that this is the maximum wait not the typical one as the schedule
may require less wait.
L0 = HP + ((n− 1) + 2)(D − 1) (2.2)
The way to implement these diﬀerent “waves” is by scheduling diﬀerent di-
rections in a router independently; an idea inspired by dimension-slicing used in
dimension-ordered routing in meshes and tori. We used what we call direction-
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slicing of the pipelines, such that each direction has its own pipeline. This pipeline
is a virtual one going through diﬀerent routers (not in the same router). We will
describe this idea in the case of a 2D mesh or torus.
In a 2D mesh or torus, each dimension has two directions (E and W for the
x-dimension; N and S for the y-dimension). The pipelines of directions of the
same dimension (i.e. N,S and E,W ) are running in opposite ways as shown in
Figure 2.3. In this technique, each port of a router is scheduled independently of
all other ports in a pipelined way such that the downstream router in the same
direction will forward packets from the same domain after P cycles where P is
the pipeline depth of the router. These schedules are imposed on output channels
of each router to avoid timing channels based on contention in the allocator (as
detailed in the next section).
Figure 2.3 illustrates an example of 16-node 2D mesh schedule of 3 domains
(colored white, grey, black). There are two waves south-east (SE) (as the one
shown in Figure 2.2 and north-west (NW) running in the mesh. Each channel
propagates packets according to the following schedule (white, white, gray, and
black) and repeats. It is worth noting that using such a schedule results in half of
the bandwidth being allocated to the white domain, whereas the black and grey
domains guarantee only a quarter of the bandwidth for each of them. This illus-
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trates the beneﬁt of our schedule in statically assigning non-uniform bandwidth
allocation to domains.
packet ordering and deadlock freedom
2.3 SurfNoC Router Micro-architecture
The micro-architecture of the SurfNoC router has two main goals:
1. Ensuring a timing channel free contention between packets, i.e. contention
can occur between packets from the same domain and not between packets
from diﬀerent domains;
2. Scheduling the output channels of each routers in a way that maintains the
surf schedule across the whole network;
In order to achieve these two goals, we used a dynamic number of virtual
channels that are partitioned between domains independent of load (§2.3.1). We
analyzed the VC allocator and switch allocators to make sure they are timing-
channel free (§2.3.2). The scheduling of output channels is done through masking
requests to the switch allocator from packets until its turn for the output channel
arrives in the wave pipeline (§2.3.3).
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2.3.1 Partitioning Virtual Channels
Spatial partitioning of the queues is not a new idea [89, 21]. Static partitioning
of virtual channels is done through restricting the routing algorithm so that it
generates output virtual channels in the range allowed for domain of the packet.
This partitioning ensures non-interference between packets from diﬀerent domains
while they wait in the buﬀers before being forwarded, i.e. eliminating the head-
of-line (HOL) problem between domains.
We added support for diﬀerent queue length as well as diﬀerent number of
queues (or virtual channels) using the same amount of storage.
2.3.2 Allocators
The SurfNoC router has two allocators, VC allocator and SW allocator. We
used a separable-allocator as the baseline allocator. These allocators use round
robin arbiters. This may lead to timing channels if requests are allowed from
diﬀerent domains to the same resource. We will detail how we prevent that from
happening for both allocators.
Virtual Channel Allocators The requesters of the VC allocator are pack-
ets requesting the upstream router virtual channels. The resources are virtual
channels of the upstream routers. By restricting the routing circuit to only issue
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requests for virtual channels that belongs to the corresponding domain, contention
is guaranteed to be between packets from the same domain. Actually, we can use
this property to reconstruct the VC allocator to be D VC allocators of size v × v
where D is the number of domains and v is the number of virtual channels per
domain (across ports not per port) instead of one large VC allocator of size V ×V
where V = D.v. This design can help save power by power-gating some of these
allocators if the number of required domains is less than D for a certain appli-
cation. Figure 2.5 depicts an example of 3 × 3 VC allocator and illustrates the
rational behind the non-interference support in the VA stage as well as the opti-
mization of separate D allocators. This also shows that we can use any arbiters
or allocator design for VC allocation because it is intrinsically interference-free.
Switch Allocator The SW allocator assigns output ports to virtual channels.
Since any virtual channel can request any port, we cannot apply the same tech-
nique we used for the VC allocator of dividing the allocator into separate smaller
allocators. Another problem arises from the fact that switch ports are shared
among virtual channels from diﬀerent domains (as shown in Figure 2.3.2) which
means that requests to the switch can be denied if two VCs (belonging to two
diﬀerent domains) on the same input port and requesting two legitimate (accord-
ing to the surf schedule) output ports will contend on the crossbar input port
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leading to one of them delayed, and thus a timing channel exists. We can solve
this problem by using the input speedup parameter of the crossbar with value D,
and hence no contention between domains on switch input ports. Figure 2.3.2
shows an example of such conﬁguration.
mention the time/space trade-oﬀ in the discussion section in the end of the
paper
By solving the input port request of the allocator, we can now design the
switch allocator as a separable one of size Dp× p where p is the number of ports
of the router. It is worth noting that it does not matter if the allocator is input-
ﬁrst or output-ﬁrst because of two reasons. First, an input arbiter is responsible
for one input to the crossbar that is shared between VCs from the same domain.
Second, by using dimensional order routing and the surf scheduling, a VC can
request only one output port. Requests to an output port are masked using the
scheduler state so that only requests from the domain which owns the current
time slot reaches the allocator (i.e. no contention between diﬀerent domains can
happen in the output arbiter).
2.3.3 Scheduler
The scheduler is a set of p tables each indexed by a counter, one for each router
output port. The initial state of the counter is pre-determined at design time in
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order to enforce the surf schedule. The number of slots in the tables is determined
by the number of domains. The selected element from the array is used as input
to a decoder. The decoder output is used to mask requests to the switch allocator
as shown in Figure 2.7. If the number of domains D is greater than the pipeline
depth (including channel traversal) P , the schedule table is initialized according
to Equation 2.3 where Sid is the schedule of port i at index d, l is the location
of the node in the dimension of port i, l′ is the location of the node in the other
dimension.
Sid =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
((D − P )(l + l′) + d) mod D if i ∈ {0, 2}
(−(D − P )(l + l′) + d) mod D if i ∈ {1, 3}
(2.3)
2.3.4 Pipelining and separation discussion
We have so far discussed separation regarding each pipeline stage separately
but the question remains whether pipelining and pipeline stalls can cause inter-
ference or not. We will discuss each pipeline stage and the basic idea is to ensure
that stalls do not induce interference between separate domains.
Buﬀer write and route computation (BW/RC) This stage is the ﬁrst stage
of the pipeline and because of credit-based ﬂow control we are assuming, ﬂits do
not enter the router unless there is a guaranteed space in the buﬀer for it. Spatial
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separation is ensured because VC allocation is done in the upstream router. Route
computation can be done in parallel for all ﬂits at the front of all virtual channels
(waiting for RC). No interference can be caused in this stage.
Virtual channel allocation (VA) At this stage all ﬂits send requests to the
VC allocator. Using our design, interference can happen between virtual channels
from the same domain but not between those from distinct domains. Stalled ﬂits
because of lack of free virtual channels (in the downstream router) prevent only
ﬂits from the same virtual channel from making progress. This can be insured by
recording state in the pipeline for each virtual channel, i.e. stalls due to virtual
channel allocation have to be per virtual channel (not per input port).
Switch allocation (SA) Switch allocation can fail, due to contending ﬂits
for switch ports (limited to virtual channels from the same domain), which causes
stalls in the pipeline. We avoid stalling the whole port (which leads to interference
between domains) by having a separate state in the pipeline stage for each virtual
channel. Switch allocation can also be stalled because of lack of buﬀering in the
downstream router, i.e. waiting for a credit. This stall eﬀect is limited to a virtual
channel and can be handled using the same way the failed SW allocation stall.
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Table 2.1: Speciﬁcations of implemented design.
The key idea here is stalls can aﬀect ﬂits in the stalled stage and all previous
stages only from the same virtual channel. Thus, we can guarantee separation
because we statically assign virtual channels to domains.
2.3.5 RTL Implementation
Table 2.1 brieﬂy describes the speciﬁcations of the implemented SurfNoc router
design.
Buﬀer Write This stage is the ﬁrst stage of the pipeline, and because we are
assuming a credit-based ﬂow control, ﬂit do not enter the router unless there is a
guaranteed space in the buﬀer for them. Buﬀers are implemented as circular FIFO
queues where the incoming ﬂit is queued when it arrives from one of the input
ports. There is one buﬀer queue for each virtual channel. Buﬀer unit selects one
of the virtual channel buﬀers to queue the ﬂit. This decision is made entirely using
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the source router ID, destination router ID, the current router ID, and the surf
schedule. The ﬂits wait in the buﬀers to be processed by the route computation
(RC) unit. The ﬂits are de-queued from the buﬀer when the crossbar sends out
ﬂits to the downstream routers.
In our implementation, we used ﬁve ports, two domains, and two virtual chan-
nels per domain. Hence, there were total of twenty virtual channels across all
the ports. The domain of the ﬂit was selected based on the surf schedule and
the virtual channel was selected based on whether there was a need to take the
wraparound link. Wraparound link is taken when the path to the destination
router is shorter through the wraparound link as compared to the normal link.
Virtual channel, VC0 was used when there was no need of wraparound links.
However, if the router selected the wraparound link, VC1 was used for routing to
avoid the deadlock condition and hence, the ﬂit was queued into the VC1 of the
selected port and domain.
Figure 2.8 gives an example of buﬀer write operation. The upstream router
sends ﬂit from domain 0s virtual channel-0 buﬀer. The current router receives the
ﬂit at its west port. There are four possible buﬀers corresponding to each domain
and virtual channel. However, the control logic extracts information about the
source ID and destination ID from the ﬂit and puts the ﬂit in the west ports
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domain-0 VC-0 buﬀer (at location pointed by tail pointer). The tail pointer
increments and points to next location in the queue.
Credit Table Since we are using a credit-based ﬂow control, the buﬀer unit
maintains a credit table that stores the number of buﬀer space available in the
downstream routers for each virtual channel buﬀer. The router can de-queue the
current routers buﬀer and send out the ﬂit from one of the output ports only when
there is at least one buﬀer space available in the downstream router. The router
stalls if there are no credits available for the downstream routers virtual channel
buﬀer. Credit table is not maintained for the port connected to the processor are
the ﬂits are sent to the processor if it is ready to accept the ﬂit. A valid signal is
kept that tells if the processor is ready to accept the ﬂits. The router looks for
this signal and sends out the ﬂit only when the signal is set.
The credit count of the credit table is incremented and decremented based on
the credit in and credit out signals. The current router sends out credit out signal
to the upstream router when a ﬂit is de-queued from the current routers virtual
channel buﬀer to indicate that a space is emptied in the current router. The
upstream router in turn increments the credit count upon receiving this signal.
Similarly, when the downstream router sends out ﬂit from one of its virtual channel
buﬀer, the current router receives credit in signal from the downstream router and
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it increments the credit count for that virtual channel buﬀer. Figure 2.9 illustrates
the above description of credits ﬂow and the result of ﬂit transfer on the credit
table count.
Route Computation As we implemented deterministic dimension order rout-
ing, a ﬂit ﬁrst travels in east/west dimension until it reaches the destination
column (router); then, it changes dimension and travels in north/south dimension
until it reaches the destination row (router). If the routing distance from current
router to the destination router is equal from two paths, the deterministic routing
always selects the path which does not has wraparound link in order to avoid any
dependency that might arise if the decision is made on ﬂy. RC unit processes
the current ﬂit (pointed by head pointer) in the buﬀer queue and if the ﬂit type
is head or head-tail, it computes the output port and output virtual channel for
routing. In other words, RC unit computes the route on per packet basis (not per
ﬂit). Also, similar to the buﬀer unit, RC unit computes the route that is based
entirely on the source router ID, destination router ID, and the current router
ID. After selecting the output virtual channel for the route, RC unit sends this
request to the VC allocator unit to actually allocate the output virtual channel
for a packet Figure 2.10.
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When the RC unit takes a ﬂit from the buﬀer, it already knows the domain
of the ﬂit because there are separate buﬀers for each domains virtual channels.
Because the output port and domain are known, the RC has only two choices
of output virtual channels for the selected domain and the output port. In our
implementation, because there are two virtual channels for a domain, there are
only two choices of output virtual channels, VC0 and VC1. RC unit selects either
VC0 or VC1 based on the need of taking the wraparound link. Wraparound link is
taken when the path to the destination router is shorter through the wraparound
link as compared to the normal link.
Virtual Channel Allocation The VC unit performs the function of arbitrating
between the 20 input virtual channels for allocating the 20 output virtual channels.
The inputs to the VC unit are 20 requests from the input virtual channels, each
request holding the 5 bit ID of the desired output virtual channel, as computed
by the RC unit. For each output virtual channel, a 20-bit vector is extracted
from these inputs. In this vector, each bit is set if the corresponding input VC
requests that output VC. This concept is shown in Figure 2.11.These vectors are
then rotated based on a round-robin scheme that ensures fairness in arbitration.
Here the zeroth bit of the vector gets the highest priority and the nineteenth bit
gets the lowest priority. In every round of arbitration, original vector is rotated a
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number of times such that the request that was granted in the previous round is
pushed to the nineteenth bit. Thus the request that is granted the output virtual
channel in the current round of arbitration gets the least priority in the next
round of arbitration. After the rotation, a priority allocator is implemented that
allocates each output virtual channel to the highest priority requester which is the
ﬁrst valid request starting from the zeroth bit. Once an output VC is allocated, its
state is changed to ’BUSY’. The output VC is freed (status changed to ’FREE’)
when the switch allocation unit sends an acknowledgement that the outgoing ﬂit
is the tail ﬂit of the current packet. Thus, an output VC is allocated when the
head ﬂit of a packet is encountered and is held by the same packet/input VC till it
forwards all its ﬂits. The outputs of the VC unit are the 5-bit input VC IDs that
have been granted the 20 output virtual channels and a 20-bit ’VC alloc done’
vector in which each bit is set if the corresponding output VC is busy.
Switch Allocation The primary role of the switch allocator is to allocate the
ﬁve output ports among the 20 output virtual channels. Additionally, it also sends
out the tail ﬂit acknowledgement signal for the other units, whenever the ﬂit that
is going to be forwarded on an output port is a tail ﬂit. The main diﬀerence
between the virtual channel arbitration and switch port arbitration is that the
former is on per-packet basis, whereas the latter is on per-ﬂit basis. Thus, the SA
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unit performs the arbitration for the output port on every clock cycle. In other
words, it does it for each ﬂit based on the SurfNoC schedule. At a given clock
cycle, there can be contention between packets of same domain only, as per the
SurfNoC schedule. So, for every output port, the SA unit checks the schedule and
allows only valid requests to contend for the output ports. A request is realized
as valid if there is a credit available in the corresponding downstream router and
if the ﬂit belongs to the right domain. Again, the output port is granted to
one of the valid requests based on a round robin scheme. The inputs to this
unit are the input VC IDs that have been granted the 20 output VCs and the
credit table information from the buﬀer unit. The outputs are the 5-bit input VC
IDs that have been granted each of the ﬁve output ports and the 20-bit tail ﬂit
acknowledgement signal (Figure 2.12).
Crossbar Switch or Buﬀer Read The SA unit provides the connection infor-
mation in the form of 5-bit virtual channel IDs for each of the ﬁve output ports.
This makes a connection from the input virtual channel buﬀers to the output
ports. The buﬀer unit pops out ﬂits from these input virtual channel buﬀers on
the corresponding output ports. At the same time, buﬀer unit sends out credit
out signals to the upstream routers to indicate that a space is emptied in the
current routers buﬀer.
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2.4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance and separation features of our
SurfNoC scheme. We also evaluate the area and power overhead compared to a
mesh network without non-interference support.
2.4.1 Experimental setup
We implemented a model of the SurfNoC router in BookSim 2.0 [22], a cycle-
level interconnection network simulator. The simulator is warmed up until steady
state is reached and statistics are reset, then a sample of the packets is measured
from the time it enters the source queue until it is received. For latency measure-
ments, the simulation runs until all packets under measurement leave the network.
Table 2.2 provides the simulation parameters used for diﬀerent schemes. We evalu-
ated four schemes, two which do not provide separation guarantees while the other
two support strong separation. The non-separation baselines are an input-queued
router with minimal resources which achieves almost 40% saturation throughput
(Baseline-small), and a similar router but with much more resources (buﬀers and
input-speedup in the crossbar switch) which we call Baseline-fast. We chose to use
two baselines because the separation supporting router includes more resources
and would achieve more throughput than a baseline with minimal area, which
will hide the lost throughput due to the static scheduling. The non-interference
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Table 2.3: Diﬀerent conﬁgurations
supporting schemes are a straightforward (TDMA) (the whole network forwards
packets from the same domain) and an input-queued router which enforces the
surf schedule (Surf ). Table 2.3 shows the diﬀerent conﬁgurations used for diﬀerent
number of domains for Surf and TDMA.
2.4.2 Impact on latency
We ﬁrst examine the impact of our non-interference support on latency with
diﬀerent number of domains and diﬀerent number of nodes under the uniform
random traﬃc pattern. In order to understand the eﬀect of time-division multi-
plexing of channels, we measure zero-load latency (latency at oﬀered load of 0.1%
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of capacity for only one domain) and plot it for diﬀerent number of domains in
Figure 2.13. In this ﬁgure, we plot latency in cycles (y-axis) vs. number of do-
mains on the x-axis for two network sizes of 64-nodes (Figure 2.4.2) and 256-nodes
(Figure 2.4.2). We compare 4 conﬁgurations: baseline-small, baseline-fast, tdma
and surf. It is clear that the latency overhead of surf scales much better than
tdma for the same network size (for example, the overhead is reduced the over-
head from 66 to 19 cycles by 71.3% for network sizes of 64 nodes with 16 domains.
The savings is even greater (up to 84.7%) for a 256-node network. We can see that
there is one exception to this reduction in latency which happens for 5 domains.
It is a subtle case that happens only for 5 domains, because the packet leaves the
router after 1 cycle of switch traversal (ST), spends 1 cycle for link traversal (LT)
and after 2 cycles of buﬀer write (BW) and virtual channel allocation (VA) in the
upstream router (total of 4 cycles during which the upstream router propagates
packets form other domains), it becomes ready for switch allocation (SA) without
any wait using tdma leading to same latency overhead of surf scheduling. One
would also notice that the beneﬁts are higher for larger networks because of the
increased average number of hops. We can conclude that, in general, the savings
of surf scheduling is more scalable with larger networks as well as higher number
of domains.
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In order to clearly understand how the overhead scales with network sizes or
average number of hops, we re-plotted zero-load latency of 2D mesh networks
of sizes varied from 16 to 256 nodes with 16-domains under the uniform random
traﬃc pattern. It is clear that the latency of both baselines increases with network
size due to higher average number of hops. We can see that the overhead of surf
scheduling is almost independent of network size (average number of hops) leading
to a parallel line to the baseline with constant overhead of 19 cycles (except for
16-nodes) because the packet wait-time depends only on the number of dimensions
and number of domains. On the other hand, the larger the network, the higher the
overhead for TDMA scheduling because a packet has to wait for its turn at each
hop in the path to its destination. This clearly shows that our scheme is scalable
with network size and proves our intuition of latency overhead independence of
number of hops.
Zero-load latency is just one latency metric, thus, we now study latency as
a function of network oﬀered load. Figure 2.15 shows average latency measured
after convergence as a function of oﬀered load for a 2D mesh network of 64-nodes
under uniform random and transpose traﬃc patterns. We vary aggregate network
oﬀered load on the x-axis, i.e. if we have D domains, all domains oﬀered load
is the value on the x-axis. We used 2 domains in this experiment. We can see
that surf scheduling maintains its latency saving at all oﬀered load values lower
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that the saturation point of the network. We can also see that loss saturation
bandwidth of the separation supporting networks is small compared to that of the
baseline-fast conﬁguration. We will examine individual domain throughput of the
network in the next section.
2.4.3 Throughput
We want to understand the eﬀect of non-interference on throughput from three
perspectives: single domain throughput, aggregate network throughput and sin-
gle domain throughput independence of other domains load. We checked these
properties for a 2D mesh 64-nodes network with 2 and 8 domains.
Figure 2.16 shows the eﬀect of supporting non-interference on single domain
throughput for the two schemes: tdma and surf. We can observe that before
the saturation point, the throughput of a single domain (only one domain is
allowed to inject packets in the network regardless of the number of domains) is
exactly the same as if the network is not partitioned. However, we can also see
that one domain saturation throughput is inversely proportional to the number
of domains. In fact, it is almost half(one eighth) of the saturation throughput of
baseline conﬁguration using the same resources (buﬀers and input speedup of the
switch) as can be seen in Figure 2.4.3 (2.4.3) for two(eight) domains. This even
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distribution of bandwidth is expected because of uniformly dividing the virtual
channels among domains and time-division multiplexing of channels.
In order to understand the eﬀect of separation on aggregate throughput of the
whole network, we run an experiment varying oﬀered load of all domains from 0 to
1 and measuring the aggregate network throughput (average number of packets re-
ceived during a certain time slot) of all domains for all conﬁgurations. The results
are plotted in Figure 2.17 for 2 and 8 domains. In this experiment “baseline-
fast” uses the same buﬀer and input speedup values of the separation-supporting
conﬁgurations(tdma and surf) in order to measure the performance loss due to
non-interference support using the same set of resources. Although we can see
that saturation throughput is reduced by around 11.7%, aggregate throughput
loss is only limited to 5% and 4% for 2 and 8 domains, respectively. Figure 2.4.3
clearly shows that the network can operate when oﬀered load is below satura-
tion throughput without any performance loss. Non-interference conﬁgurations
have higher saturation throughput than the small baseline because it uses more
resources, and lower than the fast baseline that include same resources because
of unused time slots due to schedule enforcement. Moreover, we can see in Fig-
ure 2.4.3 that if all domains are trying to inject packets at just 10% of the network
capacity the network reach saturation leading to increased latencies. This can be
42
tackled by non-uniformly allocating the bandwidth according to application spe-
ciﬁc requirements.
In order to verify the beneﬁts of assigning bandwidth non-uniformly, we per-
formed an experiment on a 2D mesh network with 64 nodes and 3 domains.
Bandwidth (VCs and time slots in the schedule) is assigned as follows: quarter
of the bandwidth is assigned to domain-0 and domain-1, each; half of the band-
width is assigned to domain-2. This non-uniform allocation is done by devising a
schedule with 4 slots and assigning domain-3 time slots to domain-2. Saturation
throughput as expected is 0.09 for both domain 0 and 1, while it is 0.21 for domain
2. Latency at 5% injection rate is 36(53) cycles for domain-2 and 39(53) cycles for
domains 0 and 1 using surf scheduling(straightforward tdma). This shows that
our scheme can have latency beneﬁts as well as throughput beneﬁt by designing
a non-uniform surf schedule.
We examine the non-interference between domains by varying one domain’s
oﬀered load while keeping the other domain oﬀered load constant at maximum
in a 2D 64-nodes mesh with 2 domains. We plot both domain’s throughput for
baseline-fast and domain 1 throughput for surf as a function of domain 0 oﬀered
load in Figure 2.18. We can see that domain 1 throughput is independent of
domain 0 traﬃc if we use the surf scheduling but not for the baseline case.
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2.4.4 Area and power overhead
Area The SurfNoC router requires modiﬁcations to the crossbar, more buﬀering
and bigger switch allocator (due to bigger crossbar). For a D domain network, we
added D input speedup in crossbars. Crossbars area scales linearly with the input
speedup D because we increase only one dimension of the crossbar. We veriﬁed
this trend using DSENT [83] (with 45 nm bulk LVT running at 1 GHz with 0.3
injection rate) and it scales linearly. For example, while a 5× 5 crossbar occupies
1598.08 μm2, a 20 × 5 consumes are of 7525.76 μm2 which is almost a factor of
4.7 for input speedup 4.
Baseline-small uses 48 entries per input port, assuming 32-bit ﬂits, DSENT
estimates an area of 0.0125 mm2. On the other hand, surf and baseline-fast uses
128 entries occupying 0.0327 mm2, a factor of 2.62 overhead against the baseline-
small.
We also added the scheduler which is mainly p copies of a a counter (where p is
the number of output ports), D entries memory a D× 2D decoder and D.p AND
gates (assuming that each domain requests one port regardless of the number of
VCs per domain). We estimate the scheduler to be of negligible area compared to
the router. For example, the storage requirement for a 16-domain 5-port router
is just 324 bits.
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Power Having seen area overhead, we now discuss power consumption overhead.
Buﬀers power consumption increases from 11.9 mW for the baseline-small to 29.3
mW for the baseline-fast and surf schemes, an overhead of 146%. We couldn’t
model crossbars power using DSENT because it uses multiplexer-based crossbars
which is not suitable for large crossbars (as in the case of 80× 5 crossbar, a 5× 5
crossbar with input speedup of 16). However, we estimate that crossbar power
consumption with input speedup would scale linearly with the input speedup
because dynamic power consumption is directly proportional to capacitance which
is directly proportional to wire length which increases only linearly with input
speedup without output speedup. DSENT estimates a 5× 5 crossbar to consume
1.24 mW of power. If we scaled that by 16x, a crossbar with input speedup of 16
would consume a 19.9 mW.
2.5 Veriﬁcation of Non-interference
In order to prove non-interference between domains of our arbitration scheme,
we used Gate-level information-ﬂow tracking (GLIFT) logic [87, 86]. GLIFT logic
captures all digital information, including implicit and timing-channel ﬂows, be-
cause all information ﬂows represent themselves in decision-making circuit con-
structs such as multiplexers. For example, an arbitration operation leaks infor-
mation if the control bits of the multiplexers depend on one of the two domains
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but it will not leak information (or cause interference) if arbitration is based on a
static schedule. GLIFT tracking logic can accurately capture this fact because it
is precise (i.e. not conservative in the primitive shadow gates but is conservative
in compositional shadow circuit). For example, a shadow-AND gate propagates
a label of HIGH only if the output of the AND gate depends on the HIGH in-
put(i.e. if one of a two-input AND gate is LOW zero, the output is guaranteed
to be zero and thus does not depend on the HIGH input). GLIFT automatically
generates conservative shadow logic that can be used to prove non-interference
between domains for a given circuit. Shadow logic is a tracking logic used as a
veriﬁcation technique (and is not intended to be part of the ﬁnal system, thus
does not cost any area or power). We integrated the scheduler (§2.3.3) enforcing
the surf schedule into a Verilog implementation of a switch allocator [46]. We
used a two-domain allocator that allocates requests of diﬀerent virtual channels
to output ports. We modiﬁed the allocator to have a request per VC rather than
per input port (as in the original design [46]). We synthesized the allocator using
Synopsis Design compiler, then generated its shadow logic and veriﬁed the sep-
aration property using simulation of the resulting circuit. We assigned a LOW
label for VC 0 requests and a HIGH label for VC 1. We tested inputs for VCs
sharing the same input port requesting diﬀerent and same output port. In all
cases grants signals had the same label of its respective virtual channels which
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proves that grants are independent of requests from the other domain. We also
reversed labels of VC0 (HIGH) and VC1 (LOW) to verify that separation holds
for the other way of information ﬂow (Domain 0 to Domain 1). This proves that
the crossbar arbitration, and thus physical channels, is timing-channel free which
(in addition to static VC allocation) ensures network non-interference. Freedom
of two-way information ﬂow, or complete non-interference was veriﬁed.
2.6 Conclusions
Network-on-chips play an important role in integrating many components,
whether they are accelerators, cores, or memories. Not only are they increasingly
prevalent in consumer general purpose silicon, but they also seeing introduction
in high assurance domains where security and veriﬁcation accuracy are crucial
in saving time, money, and potentially even lives. Separation is an important
property that allows designers to reason about systems eﬃciently by deﬁning sub-
components that can be veriﬁed independently while limiting the design space.
While we believe this paper is an important step regarding gate-level separa-
tion in NoCs, there are many questions that merit further investigation. First,
we make no use of application-level knowledge that might shed light on the ex-
pected communication patterns. Co-scheduling communicating tasks (with global
traﬃc knowledge) [57] to be near to one another might introduce the oppor-
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tunities for non-homogeneous yet non-interfering schedules across the network.
Application-level knowledge of lattice-based information ﬂow policies might be
combined with this work to allow more ﬂexibility in scheduling between compa-
rable domains [89]. Second, our approach uses a dimension ordered routing that
is oblivious to our time-division multiplexing scheme (surf-scheduling). As such,
a packet will only change dimensions after it ﬁnishes traversing one dimension. A
non-interference aware routing technique might minimize wait time by introduc-
ing more turns opportunistically. In general, the relationship between interference
and more aggressive optimizations would be interesting to explore. Third, there
are other topologies to consider, e.g. high-radix routers such as ﬂattened butter-
ﬂies [45]. Although ﬂattened butterﬂies can use dimension-order routing and thus
surf scheduling might directly be applied, non-minimal routing is usually required
to improve throughput. Enforcing a surf-like schedule with adaptive routing might
increase latency. However, all of these open questions require a foundation from
which to build.
The foundation we propose here is SurfNoC, an eﬃcient time-division-multiplexed
packet-switched k-ary n-cube network. SurfNoC exploits the dimension-ordered
routing algorithms in mesh networks by scheduling channels in each dimension in
a pipelined fashion so that packets propagate in the dimension as if there is no
domain restrictions on channels. Packets have to wait for their domain’s turn only
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when they enter, exit, and potentially in changing dimensions. We discuss our
wave-based domain scheduled network and describe the implementation at the
level of the router micro-architecture with respect to non-interference support.
Importantly, while several works have discussed interference at a high level, we
believe this is the ﬁrst time that true cycle-level non-interference has been proven
to hold at the gate-level. In addition to the formal gate-level analysis needed to
demonstrate that, we show that our schedule latency overhead scales eﬃciently
with number of separation domains compared to a straightforward synchronous
TDMA scheme (saving up to 75% of latency overhead in the case of 64-node with
32 domains). Although each domain’s throughput suﬀers as the network is parti-
tioned (as would be expected), the aggregate network performance remains very
close to no-separation baseline. More importantly, the latency overhead remains
constant with respect to network size.
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[][Odd cycles.] [][Even cycles]
Figure 2.1: Time-division multiplexing scheduling in a 16-node 2D mesh (only one direction
of channels is shown for illustration purposes).
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[][Odd cycles] [][Even cycles]
Figure 2.2: Surf scheduling in a 16-node 2D mesh (only one direction of channels is shown for
illustration purposes).
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Figure 2.3: Surf scheduling in 16-node 2D mesh with three application domains (denoted by
white, grey, and black) assuming a single-cycle routers for illustration purpose. The schedule
runs as white, white, grey, and black and repeats, giving the white domain half the bandwidth.
A packet (the white box under the node S) belongs to the white domain is sent from the node
marked by S to the node marked by R. The ﬁgure contains six consecutive cycles. At T = 1,
the packet is forwarded on the S port in the y-dimension (which is scheduled to forward white
packets). It keeps moving in the y-dimension until T = 3 when it needs to move in the
x-dimension on the W port. The packet waits 2 cycles (T=4 and T= 5) until it is the white
domain’s turn on the W port and ﬁnally it is forwarded to its destination on T = 6. Another
wait may happen again in the destination router (R) to forward the packet on the ejection
port waiting for the white domain’s turn.
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Figure 2.4: Partitionable virtual channels
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Figure 2.5: Virtual channel allocator: A 3x3 separable input-ﬁrst VC allocator. In this
example, we assume that VC0 and VC2 are assigned to domain 0 and VC1 is assigned to
domain 1. Dashed lines shows signals that can never be 1 due to route computation
restrictions. This example shows that we can reconstruct the allocator into smaller ones.
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Figure 2.6: Crossbar with input speedup to eliminate contention on switch input port
between VCs from diﬀerent domains.
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Figure 2.7: Scheduler: The scheduler output is used to mask requests to the switch output
ports according to the surf schedule.
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Figure 2.8: a) Buﬀer write operation from west input port: input ﬂit arrives from domain-0s
VC-0 (D0-VC0), control logic selects D0-VC0 buﬀer queue based on the Source ID and the
Destination ID of the ﬂit. b) Result of Buﬀer write operation: Input ﬂit is queued in the buﬀer
and the tail pointer increments from 0 to 1).
Figure 2.9: Description of credit-based ﬂow. a) Initial state: credit count is 4. b)-f) router 1
sends out four ﬂits H, B, B, and T to router 2; the credit count decrements to 0. g)-l) router 2
sends out credit signals to router 1; credit count of router 1 becomes 4 again.
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Figure 2.10: RC unit takes 16-bit heads from the ﬂits pointed by buﬀer queues head pointers
and generates request for output VCs for each input VC. For example, the IVC0 signal stores
the output VC ID requested by input virtual channel-0 of domain-0 (D0-VC0).
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Figure 2.11: The I/O ports of the VC allocator unit (top) and the VC unit implementation
(bottom). For OVC0, for instance, the 4th bit in the 20-bit vector is set if IVC4 requests for
OVC0. The vectors are then rotated based on the previously granted request such that it
receives the least priority. The priority allocation logic then grants each of the output VC to
the ﬁrst bit that is set in the respective vector.
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Figure 2.12: The SurfNoC schedule (SA) logic masks all the requests that do not belong to
the scheduled domain for the current clock cycle or do not satisfy the credit requirements.
Thus, at most, only 2 output VCs can contend for the same output port. The round robin
arbiter shown above allocates each of the ﬁve output ports to one of the two potential requests
every clock cycle. The ’tail ﬂit ack’ signal is computed by making use of the buﬀer head
information that is globally exposed to all the units by the buﬀer unit. For instance, the 4th
bit is set if the 4th buﬀer/IVC4 is going to forward a tail ﬂit on the output port.
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Figure 2.13: Zero-load latency for diﬀerent network size and diﬀerent number of security
domains (the two baselines are overlapped because zero-load latency does not depend on
buﬀers and crossbar input speedup).
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Figure 2.14: Zero-load latency against diﬀerent network size with 16 domains (the two
baselines are overlapped because zero-load latency does not depend on buﬀers and crossbar
input speedup).
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Figure 2.15: Average latency as a function of aggregate domains oﬀered load for 2D mesh
network of 64 Nodes: We can see that latency is stable below network saturation point.
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Figure 2.16: Throughput as a function of oﬀered load of one domain (only one domain is
injecting) for 2D 64-nodes mesh using diﬀerent number of domains.
62
[2 classes]

	
	
	
	

	

	
	
	
	
	
 	 	
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 





	







	

   
[8 classes]

	
	
	
	

	

	
	
	
	
	
 	 	
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 





	







	

   
Figure 2.17: Aggregate network throughput as a function of oﬀered load of one domain (all
domains are injecting packets) for 2D 64-nodes mesh using diﬀerent number of domains.
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Figure 2.18: Separation of uniformly distributed bandwidth. Throughput as a function of
domain 0 oﬀered load. We can see that, by using surf scheduling, domain 1 throughput is
independent of domain 0 load (same trend was measured for domain 0 throughput while
varying domain 1 load).
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Chapter 3
Hardware-Assisted Context
Management for Accelerator
Virtualization
Virtualization has emerged as a common means by which one may share and
more optimally utilize underlying physical resources. As custom hardware acceler-
ators are called upon to take signiﬁcant portions of the workload from traditional
CPUs, the state of computing tasks is increasingly spread across a set of highly
heterogeneous devices. Eﬀective virtualization of a system with such distributed
and heterogeneous memory elements can be extremely complicated as both ﬁne-
grained scheduling and the safe management of the underlying hardware state
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may be required [61] [54] [35]. For each distinct type of accelerator, the virtual
machine monitor (VMM) must be aware of what subset of the machine state is
critical to maintain correctness, which subset is potentially damaging if leaked
to other VMs, and how critical parts of the hardware state can be managed and
restored by the interface provided by that accelerator core.
This complexity also comes with a performance and system management cost,
speciﬁcally in that it leads to an inability to coordinate the accelerators eﬀectively.
Switching the context for an accelerator can have a non-negligible cost (driver/OS
and driver/device communication, cleanup, power management, etc) and that cost
can be variable based on time. If the VMM is to coordinate the accelerators it
must have an accurate view of what resources are free for scheduling and what
the costs of scheduling might be. The VMM must either be able to estimate
those costs from models, gather them through further communication with the
accelerators (which may be then subject to delay due to resource contention), or
give up the opportunity for eﬃcient coordinated control.
There are several ways in which a designer may approach this problem. First,
they might consider ﬁxed pass-through (e.g. Intel VT-d [40]) where an accelerator
is exclusively assigned to one VM, but this exclusive relationship limits sharing.
A second approach is for the hypervisor to arbitrate between several VMs with
one VM having access at a time, where the hypervisor halts operation of the
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accelerator and restores it to a known state between guests [71]. This approach
requires very little in the way of both additional memory and network communi-
cation, but carries a risk of signiﬁcantly reduced throughput when interruptions
cause the loss of interrupted but unﬁnished work. A third approach is to avoid
dropping unﬁnished tasks, instead storing the intermediate results in memory
for future retrieval. This method prevents wasting of allocated timing slots, but
might incur heavy data communication [43] [47]. A fourth option is to involve the
accelerator itself in the alleviation of context switch overhead. If the accelerator
is granted some leeway in when the context switch occurs through a modicum
of automation inside of a device, smarter switch timing might be possible saving
both time and space. This might require an understanding of the computation
and a careful re-architecting of the accelerator.
While performance is one important factor, the sharing of state also needs
to be completed in a way that is secure. Given the importance of crypto oper-
ations, both in performance and security, they are a natural space in which to
study accelerator design tradeoﬀs. To study the impact and suitability of diﬀer-
ent accelerator virtualization strategies and to provide optimizations for crypto
devices, we implement a series of fast modular exponentiation engines. By mak-
ing minimum changes to the device interface, we enable hardware assisted context
management in such a way as to avoid exposing sensitive intermediate results to
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the upper system and as to involve local scheduling to improve performance. Our
experimental results suggest that above certain switching frequencies, the local
context switch approaches achieve signiﬁcantly higher throughput rate than more
traditional schemes and thus enable a new level of ﬁne-grain and fair scheduling.
The additional area overhead for our baseline and optimized design to implicitly
accommodate four VMs is only 36% and 15%.
3.1 Related Work
The management of accelerator-rich architectures is a very active topic of
research, but much of the work is focused on application partitioning and fair
scheduling, but less with VM-level sharing. HiPPAI [82] alleviates the overheads
of system calls and memory access by using a uniform virtual memory addressing
model based on IOMMU support and direct user mode access to accelerators.
While it is eﬃcient in limiting overheads at the user/kernel boundary, it lacks
support in resource sharing. Traditional accelerator scheduling schemes still rely
heavily on usage statistics collected from hardware. Pegasus [35] manages accel-
erators as ﬁrst class schedulable entities and uses coordinated scheduling methods
to align accelerator resource usage with platform-level management. Disengaged
scheduling [61] advocates a strategy in which the kernel intercedes between ap-
plications and the accelerator on an infrequent basis, with overuse control that
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guarantees fairness. Some work tackles the management problem by simplifying
accelerator/application integration. VEAL [17] proposes a hybrid static-dynamic
compilation approach to map a loop to a template for inner loop accelerators.
DySER [30] utilizes program phase and integrates a conﬁgurable accelerator into
specialized data-path to dynamically encode program regions into custom instruc-
tions. While these approaches are intelligent in software partitioning and mapping,
they fail to take advantage of hardware assistance in resource managing. Some
work starts to look into hardware device reusability: CHARM [20] and CAMEL
[19] tackle the sharing and management problem mainly by automating composi-
tion of accelerator building blocks (ABBs), primarily stateless arithmetic units in
ASICs.
Some projects favor managing hardware states implicitly. Task speciﬁc access
structures(TSAS) [43] inserts a multiplexer as the input of each FF to select be-
tween updating its value from the combinational logic or from previously stored
data, or simply remaining its value from the last cycle. This scheme takes the
majority of the context switch workload within the device and enables fast switch-
ing, but at the sacriﬁce of non-negligible augmented logic and memory. Hardware
checkpointing [47] where the hardware states of a device can be stored and be
rolled back regarding checkpoint, hold the potential to minimize area overhead
wisely. We recognize the value of hardware checkpointing - in fact we extend its
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role in coordinated resource management: for accelerators like an RSA engine that
implements real-time requests, hardware support in context management will be
of great help to fast and ﬁne-grained accelerator sharing.
3.2 Baseline RSA Accelerator Architecture
3.2.1 Montgomery’s Modular Multiplication and Expo-
nentiation
The core computation in an RSA crypto engine is modular exponentiation,
consisting of a number of modular multiplications. Montgomery’s modular mul-
tiplication algorithm [64] employs simply additions, subtractions, and shift oper-
ations to avoid expensive divisions. In this paper we work with an extension to
this algorithm [77]. Three k-bit integers, the modulus N , the multiplicand A and
the multiplier B are needed as inputs for computation.
Algorithm MM UMS is deﬁned as follows:
for i = 0 to i = k - 1 :
q = (S + A ∗B[i]) mod 2 (3.1)
S = (S + A ∗B[i] + q ∗N) / 2 (3.2)
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S is restructured in carry-save form as (Sc, Ss) where Sc and Ss respectively
denotes the carry and sum components of S. H-algorithm [16] transforms the com-
putation of modular exponentiation into a sequence of squares and multiplications.
Square operation could be performed when both multiplicand and multiplier are
identical. The modular exponentiation algorithm, ME UMS(M,E,N), iteratively
applies a uniﬁed multiplication or square operation, where for each bit E[i] in ex-
ponent E, both a single square operation and multiplication will be performed
when E[i] = 1 while only a square operation will be performed otherwise.
Figure 3.1: Traditional RSA accelerator
block architecture
Figure 3.2: State diagram of the original
RSA accelerator design. PRE/PRFC and
POST/POFC are the preprocessing and the
post-processing states for domain format and
carry-save format conversions. MUL and
SQR stand for modular multiplication and
square operation respectively.
Figure 3.1 shows the baseline design. The uniﬁed modular multiplication/square
module is highlighted in the shadowed region. The nine states in Figure 3.2 cap-
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ture the major stages of the entire modular exponentiation process, as discussed
in the algorithm ME UMS.
3.2.2 Sharing an RSA Accelerator
One traditional method of device sharing is hard preemptive multitasking.
The obvious drawback is that as the switching frequencies increase during heavy
sharing, the throughput rate might suﬀer signiﬁcant degradation.
To avoid the cost, two options are clear, either the OS relaxes its schedule to
wait for the task to complete or the intermediate results from hardware have to be
saved for future retrieval. The ﬁrst option is becoming increasingly diﬃcult since
an application can occupy several accelerators simultaneously, thus a perfect point
where all devices have just ﬁnished their current tasks can be extremely hard to
identify or even exist. The latter option seems to comply well with software sched-
ules, but the data movement required to store the intermediate results, coupled
with the corresponding memory updates, making this option surprisingly tricky
to execute well in practice. Moreover, exposing intermediate results to DMA are
also risky due to DMA attacks [81]. A good solution should manage these bur-
dens carefully and a new set of interfaces is needed to simplify the synchronization
process.
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3.3 Tightly Integrated Virtual Accelerator Ap-
proaches
The simplest tightly integrated design might store all local state in a set of
D ﬂip-ﬂops sprinkled throughout the design. However, this approach is also pro-
hibitively expensive. Simulation results suggest that regarding area (and power)
eﬃciency, such virtualized accelerator can add up to a 78% area overhead.
So what can we do if we want to maintain the accelerator’s capability of being
fast switched without giving up almost nearly all of our eﬃciency? We describe
two diﬀerent solutions – the simplest being to replace the local and distributed
storage elements with a set of RAMs.
3.3.1 Baseline Virtual RSA Accelerator Design Overview
In general, most sharing patterns fall into one of the four categories:
• Double Vacancy. No VM is occupying the device.
• Single occupancy. The accelerator is currently dominated by one VM while
another VM requires input data streaming for starting a new task.
• Double occupancy. One VM is scheduled to resume a previous uncompleted
computation while the other VM is in the process of computing.
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• Single occupancy. One VM requires to resume a suspended task while the
other VM is performing output data streaming.
Note that in scenario 3, two whole sets of states need to be stored. Based on
this, we include 2KB of RAM alongside the core for temporary storage. We build
a simple layer above the RSA accelerator to forward switching commands rather
than changing the slave interface directly. We add a switch signal underneath
the layer to help the controller determine the next state. In order to be able to
interrupt a task in the middle of such computation, four more states are added to
the FSM. We show the resulting state diagram in Fig. 3.3.
By enabling hardware preemption, the proposed accelerator virtualization ap-
proach successfully realizes the goal of abstracting away hardware details from
software without abandoning tasks, at the sacriﬁce of increasing critical path de-
lay by 16%.
3.4 Optimized Solution
In order to eliminate the increased critical path delay, we examine the registers
that contain useful intermediate results along the entire process of a single modular
exponentiation task. We measure the amount of memory needed to store these
intermediate results against execution time cycle Fig. 3.4.
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Figure 3.3: State diagram of an example transition case in
the baseline architecture. When receiving active switch signal
in SQR state, it will jump to WAIT SW state to store
intermediate results in local RAM. label denotes VM ID. If
the current requesting VM was in PRE state during last
switch out, next state will be set to PRE. After numerous
state transitions, the VM that was switched oﬀ during SQR
state might request again, and have a chance to restore its
state
Figure 3.4: The amount of local memory needed for storing
intermediate results. The y-axis denotes the number of hardware
registers and the x-axis denotes timeline measured by clock cycles
during a single modular exponentiation operation
75
At the completion of a modular multiplication or a square computation, only
the value of Sc and Ss (1025-bit register arrays) are a must-save among all
the large register arrays. These transition points, which we informally call SP
(sweetspots), can be intuitively pinned from the FSM inside the device controller.
If we can make sure all switching operations happen at these sweet spots, we can
signiﬁcantly reduce the RAM size required.
To achieve this goal, the device controller is slightly modiﬁed to ensure switch-
ing always happens at these spots. Upon each major state transition, the con-
tents of Sc and Ss will be forwarded to two designated register arrays Sc SW
and Ss SW . Note that the contents of these two registers will be refreshed every
time an SP is identiﬁed and will be ﬂushed during switching operation Fig. 3.5.
We also want to make sure that the OS gets control of the preemption delay so
that it can make scheduling decisions easily when it needs to context switch among
a number of concurrent applications. Upon receiving the switching command, the
device will compare the time bound to its backward counter and make a decision
about whether to reach the next SP or to simply fall back to the last stored
one. If the time bound is equal to or smaller than the value of the counter, the
current multiplication computation will be abandoned and contents of Sc SW and
Ss SW will be stored to RAM. An extra state, SWEET , is added to allow data
transfers between registers and RAMs during task switching. The state that leads
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Figure 3.5: Design of
optimized context switch
enforcement in detail.
SW DFF represents register
arrays including Sc SW and
Ss SW storing intermediate
results at previous SP
Figure 3.6: State diagram of an example transition
case in optimized design. The abort signal calculated
from time bound directs next state when switch == 1.
The current task is allowed to ﬁnish current square
operation when abort == 0, sweet state will be updated
to its next square(SQR) or multiplication(MUL)
operation judged by E[i] for future state retrieval.
to SWEET will be recorded. The relaxed timing bound can be very convenient
for scheduling purposes, considering it is diﬃcult for OS to decide the exact best
timing to switch in a device. Granted with local scheduling power, the device can
wisely help a task fully utilize its time slots. We show an example state transition
scenario in Fig. 3.6 for illustration.
The design removes multiplexer arrays from the critical paths, signiﬁcantly
lowering area cost. Meanwhile responsiveness to interrupts or context switch
commands is still guaranteed. Note that these modiﬁcations can be generally
applied to public-key crypto accelerators. By simplifying the device interfaces, the
VMM’s scheduling becomes easier and more ﬂexible. Tasks with higher priorities
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can always be ensured a quick access to hardware acceleration. The hardware
accelerator manages to secure itself in a blackbox, without exposing hardware
information unnecessarily.
3.5 Experimental Evaluation
Our evaluations are based on RTL prototypes of accelerators with standard
AHB I/O interfaces written in Verilog under the ModelSim [63] environment. We
test through the encryption process and use a Verilog testbench with a public
exponent 65537 and modulus generated from OpenSSL [67] for encryption. We
synthesize all of the RTL designs using the Synopsys Design Compiler [18] with a
45nm library and collect critical path delays and executing clock frequencies. The
area and peak power models for our embedded memories are based on CACTI 5.3
[4] and for logic and registers based on the results from Design Compiler.
3.5.1 Relative Performance
One important measure of performance is the total virtualized device through-
put as measured by the numbers of encryptions per second. We compare the virtu-
alized throughput rate from each of the designs to the upper bound of performance
where each VM is given a completely independent copy of the device (i.e. no in-
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terference at all). We simulate three scenarios representing light (concurrently
running two VMs while requests from each VM ﬁlls 10% of its timeline), medium
(two VMs with 20% requests) and near-saturating workloads (four VMs with 20%
requests) respectively. The only contention for the crypto accelerator is from mul-
tiple VMs attempting to access the engine at the same time. Figs. 3.5.1, 3.5.1,
and 3.5.1 depict the relative performance of virtualized devices under these loads
respectively.
The y-axis of each of these plots is the relative performance of the diﬀerent
schemes (as compared to our ideal case). The x-axis is the time slice granularities
under which the VMs are driving our accelerators. To simulate the fact that one
does not switch between VMs instantaneously, a running task will not attempt to
switch in a period smaller than a deﬁned time slice. In real-time, latency sensitive,
or reactive systems a design may be called upon to switch very quickly. To quantify
the suitability of each of the previously described accelerator virtualization under
various diﬀerent switching speeds, we inject requests with the size of one task
(for us, the crypto operation) but constrain the minimum window under which
those switches might occur. The courser the minimum time between switches, the
less we would expect to lose in wasted cycles as computation is abandoned on a
switch, but more applications will have to wait to get their computation onto the
accelerator. On each of the graphs there are 3 diﬀerent bars labeled “Tra” for
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“Traditional” which drops unﬁnished tasks on a switch. “Base” saves all of the
hardware state as described in Section 3.3.1. Finally, “Opti” adds the hardware
necessary to allow the accelerator to delay the switching under a ﬁxed bound as
described in Section ??.
As can be seen in these graphs, when the request workload is comparatively
low, the performance disparities among the three approaches are not as signiﬁcant
as those when task workload is heavier. However, the performance of the opti-
mized design is consistently the highest throughout all the switching frequencies
simulated. The base design has a slight advantage over traditional design when the
time slice is smaller than the time for one encryption operation. The advantage
more fully manifests when the amount of requests increases. The performance of
all three approaches in all the scenarios reaches a peak around and slightly above
25 time slice. However, when we compare 25 to 100 granularities of the three
ﬁgures, we can clearly see that the peak period tends to shrink as the workload
increases. When reaching a comparatively coarse grain scenario around 200 the
performance of all of the virtual devices suﬀer signiﬁcantly. In these situations
the bounds on switching time is large enough to cause a signiﬁcant amount of idle
time in the hardware. The optimized design outperforms the baseline consistently
because the more restricted save points limit the hardware needed and the longer
paths they cause.
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One interesting observation is the non-monotonic performance of the tradi-
tional design. The throughput rate drops as the switching frequency rises until
it reaches around 1/25. The reason behind this pattern is that when a task is
switched oﬀ and dropped, the device is more likely to waste more computation
cycles when the device is only allowed to be switched at a granularity slightly
smaller than time of one operation. Provided that the v-4 optimized design shows
at most a 3.6X performance improvement compared to the traditional design, in
20% workload scenario and reliably high eﬃciency throughout ﬁne-grain granu-
larities, the optimized design appears to be a clear choice in systems requiring
very ﬁne-grain switching when we consider performance alone.
3.5.2 Area Cost and Power Consumption
To model the area overhead and power consumption of the three virtual accel-
erators, we synthesized our RTL design in the TSMC 45nm technology. Results
show that the original accelerator occupies 0.11mm2 with a peak power consump-
tion of 54.7mW at 1.6GHz. Due to the lack of publicly available SRAM compilers
in this technology, we use CACTI 5.3 [4] to estimate the area and power of RAMs.
The area cost is shown in Fig. 3.8. The y-axis of the area plot is the absolute
area costs measured inmm2 unit of the diﬀerent schemes. The x-axis is the number
bounds of VMs that are allowed to be running concurrently on the accelerator
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(e.g. 2 corresponds to v-2 design). As we can see in the graph, the additional area
overhead of the baseline design compared to the traditional design can increase
area by up to 29% for v-2 and up to 36% for v-4. This extra price paid is primarily
due to the additional arrays of multiplexers needed to switch between states and
the additional RAMs needed to store the contents of all registers. Note that the
optimized design scales better than than the baseline. The area overhead is merely
12% and 15% for v-2 and v-4 respectively.
Similar to the area costs trends, plots of the peak power consumption present
an increasing pattern somewhat proportional to area costs. As we can see from
Fig. 3.9, where the y-axis denotes the absolute peak power consumption measured
in mW unit of the diﬀerent devices, the optimized design scales better from v-1
to v-4 than the baseline design as the default bounds of running VMs increase.
The traditional design stands out due to its more uniform power consumption.
An important conclusion is that the baseline design performs slightly worse
than both the traditional and the optimized design regarding power consumption,
whereas the traditional one suﬀers signiﬁcantly reduced throughput/watt rate for
near saturating workloads when the time slice is small. While baseline and op-
timized design already provide with most responsiveness, it is as well likely that
energy consumption can be compensated from simpliﬁed software level synchro-
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nization. Moreover, the internal memory read/write structure guarantees a quick
and safe access to intermediate data without dealing with I/O hazards.
Due to its performance and power-friendly beneﬁts, the optimized design im-
proves the throughput/watt rate by at most 3.1X over traditional design when
above switching frequency of 45 KHz magnitude and remains competitive to tra-
ditional design throughout all sharing granularity range under examination.
3.6 Conclusions
Growing heterogeneity in hardware devices continues to put easy and safe man-
agement in direct conﬂict with ﬁne-grain scheduling and virtualization. Rather
than take a top-down approach requiring that all accelerators be implemented
in a particular style, we take a bottom up approach, looking at what it takes to
manage the state of a device. In particular we found that there is a small but
non-negligible penalty for adding in explicit access to the accelerator state both
in terms of area and power. However, we also observe that there is an interesting
and previously unexplored trade-oﬀ between the scheduling power one imbues the
accelerator with and the eﬃciency with which the schedule can be managed to
minimize the waste of timing slots.
With that said, under these limitations we presented comparisons of three dif-
ferent accelerator virtualization schemes working to manage a critical device - an
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RSA accelerator. When a high degree of sharing and switching is required, the
traditional task-dropping scheme can suﬀer signiﬁcant performance degradation.
If such conditions are expected, a hardware preemption scheme can be adopted,
and with a bit of analysis, is able to alleviate the burden of resource scheduling
and context management, and to prevent sensitive intermediate data exposure.
Results show that our proposed approach manages to dramatically diminish the
performance degradation of the traditional scheme and to compensate a naive
TSAS in a low-overhead manner both in area and power. Although not yet veri-
ﬁed by timing ﬂow tracking tools, the optimized design provided decent isolation
among concurrent tasks (sharing entities) by static virtual interfaces and ﬁxed
allocated memory. We also envision that with much wider granularity of high
eﬃciency and concurrency this accelerator design can provide, diﬀerent security
favored pre-deﬁned coordination can be more easily enforced.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 3.7: Relative performance under light (a), medium (b) and near-saturating (c)
workload scenarios. V-2 and v-4 denotes the default maximum number of VMs allowed to
concurrently occupy the device.
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Figure 3.8: Comparison of area costs for v-1,
v-2 and v-4 designs
Figure 3.9: Comparison of peak power
consumption for v-1, v-2 and v-4 designs
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Chapter 4
Application-Centric Computation
Concurrency
While the last two section focus on sharing that comes up in the context
of cpu-to-cpu and accelerator-to-cpu communcation, we wanted to explore the
full system stack up through to the operating system running on one cpu. An-
droid is the most popular mobile operating system with the market share over
80 percent[3]. Its open source base and friendly libraries attract a large amount
of contributions from the app development community. In 2012, the number of
apps available in the market exceeded a million. These apps inﬂuence users’ daily
lives in communication, health, transportation, social networks, ﬁnance, enter-
tainment, etc. Undoubtedly functionality, reliability and performance of these
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apps and the underlying Android OS has crucial impact on users’ life quality
(daily experience). In 2016, with the release of Android Nougat featuring split
screen for multiple foreground apps, the need of system support for application
concurrency is unprecedented.
Within the many types of applications, human-computer interaction compo-
nents including I/Os are often the focus of user experience enhancement. That
usually includes audio and speech. For a user to truly manipulate multiple ap-
plications concurrently, speech is the optimal choice of input to advance beyond
traditional keyboard typing. However, many successful speech interfaces Apple’s
Siri, Microsoft’s Cortana are either OS speciﬁc or only targets system apps. Google
also provides interface for voice searching [73], however, it has to be performed
on a server. This becomes a major limitation of availability since mobile network
connections are often slow or intermittent, and sometimes non-existant [53]. For
a third party Android app to employ speech recognition feature, it is still incon-
venient and ineﬃcient. As speech recognition algorithms and functions are often
computation exhaustive, currently there is no feasible way to support running
multiple audio apps scalably in local environment. This fact is in direct conﬂict
with the increasing concurrency need.
To resolve the conﬂict, one has to investigate deeper. By examining the speech
recognition computations from diﬀerent libraries, we ﬁnd out that when applica-
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tions use the same library, many of their speech recognition procedures adopt sim-
ilar function calls and chains, meaning even from diﬀerent apps, the computation
paths might have considerable overlap. To take advantage of these computation
overlaps, the computation paths should at some point have the same entry point
(input). Yet another key observation is more exciting, that the speech computa-
tions are originally from the same device input (mic) and thus can have the same
set of input data. We call these data seed data. Originating from seed data, iden-
tical subsequent computations can theoretically be shared among applications.
The question is now how to share their computations safely and eﬃciently?
Fortunately on Android, there is one approach for applications to share – Inter-
Component Calls (ICCs). An application can expose functionalities through APIs
and intents. However, due to Android’s appiﬁcation [5] (decentralized) nature
(each app has a Linux userID along with server client communication mechanism
among apps) and arguably ﬂawed permission model (permissions are mostly re-
quested by app on installation and the components within an app share the same
permission), there has been huge amount of various attacks [15][23] targeting
these system design vulnerabilities. A large amount of research work has seen on
security and privacy issues[96][94][24][31][88][27], yet the inter-app attacks have
not been solved systematically. Meaning to simply share computations among
applications on a pairing basis, is not only non-scalable (overwhelmed by ICC
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communication overhead), but is also at great risk of compromised security and
privacy.
We cannot help asking these questions: What are the security obstacles fun-
damentally introduced by the appiﬁcation ecosystem layout (app isolation and
decentralization)? Whether and how we can bypass these obstacles? In the mean-
while what are the feature and components in the Android OS that can positively
inﬂuence the application sharing and concurrency?
To discover the obstacles hindering the progress of application concurrency and
performance in Android, we analyzed the major security issues and categorized
them based on the diﬀerent system components involved.
Based on the study, we made the following discovery: The supposedly “per-
formance promoting” functionality sharing mechanism through app APIs is both
vulnerability-prone (suﬀer from privilege escalation attacks[15]) and sharing-unfriendly
as not representing the server app’s best interest in a lack of system procedure
to conﬁne the sharing parties in a ﬁne-grain manner (the server app is not able
to deﬁne the scope of sharing within speciﬁc apps). The mechanism carries the
general decentralized system weaknesses but not the software-friendly business
model. We realize the unfriendly model can be another challenge in promoting
application sharing.
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We further made the key observation that centralization is strongly lacking
in Android where it is hurting both security and performance. Inspired by the
PeerReview[36] concept in distributed systems community, we propose Cashmere
– a central processing platform to guide interested apps in forming groups for shar-
ing computation on libraries. Cashmere utilizes shared memory to cache library
function call chains from concurrent running apps. By refraining the interactive
paths among service-speciﬁed apps, seed app (the app feeds the original com-
putation) side security concerns can be relieved, thus promoting conﬁdence and
willingness in sharing. The centralized scheme is well complementing the weak-
ness of the decentralized Android base (in the pure decentralized scheme, an app
is able to delay IPC communications, send incorrect results or even malicious
calls/intents; On another note, pairing apps using IPC is not scalable). Thus
the scheme boosts the client app side’s conﬁdence in sharing and can improve
computation concurrency due to the provably increased number of sharing enti-
ties and the reduced/ramiﬁed IPC overhead. Note that without the conﬁdence in
sharing, an app might choose to compile its own local library and prohibit shar-
ing radically. Thus Cashmere’s support of ﬁne-grained conﬁnement is critical in
promoting sharing and computation concurrency.
To summarize our contributions in this chapter:
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• We analyze Android ecosystem structure and propose a central platform to
support cooperative services to more securely improve application compu-
tation concurrency in the Android OS.
• We demonstrate its usefulness (performance wise) through a case study on
a popular open-source speech recognition library.
• We initialize application-centric primary grouping to grant individual app’s
ﬂexibility of action in determining security and performance trade-oﬀs.
• We further solve the increased word error rate (WER) problem due to vocab-
ulary dictionary model diﬀerences among speech recognition applications.
We propose clustering-based sub-grouping on top of primary grouping, based
on vocabulary similarities and overall WER friendliness.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides background
on Android system and discusses related work. Section 4.3 discusses the need
for central access control and describes the procedure of speech recognition. Sec-
tion 4.4 presents the architecture design of Cashmere – our application centric
access concurrency platform. Section 4.5 details the prototype implementation of
Cashmere and explains the sub-grouping algorithm. Section 4.6 evaluates Cash-
mere and discusses security impacts. Section 4.7 brieﬂy describes future work and
concluding marks.
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4.1 Background on Android Access Model, Se-
curity Challenges and Inter-Application Shar-
ing
Android’s appiﬁcation system has long been scolded for its lack of fail-safe
defaults[5]. Although each app is represented by a unique Linux UserID, Android
extends IPC to ICC where apps are able to communicate with each other beyond
their own boxes. These ICCs are often the leak holes (through overt or covert
channels) that break the boundary of inter-app data isolation and privacy pro-
tection that Android is aimed to achieve in the ﬁrst place with its appiﬁcation
structure.
In the contrary, there has been attacks targeting diﬀerent layers of Android sys-
tem. RiskRanker[31] categorized apps threat severity to high-risk (root exploits),
medium risk (privilege escalation) and low risk (non-critical data stealing) based
on malware potential. High risk apps, although may cause severe damage and loss,
of whom malicious components are obvious to detect. Medium risk apps might
have the culprit since most of their attacks directly take advantage of Android’s
ICC mechanism rather than exploiting careless system bugs. Once succeeded,
the malicious app can potentially gain dangerous permissions and sensitive data.
The study also provided interesting ﬁndings that some of the reputable apps also
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exhibit inappropriate behaviours or minor violations that make its benign title
hard to judge.
We are inspired by this observation that we can further conjecture that these
borderline apps may be categorized by other apps as dangerous or non-dangerous
apps based on the judging apps’ criteria. Currently Android only allows an app
choose to share with either system apps or all apps[5], thus an individual app’s
interest and security requirement is not protected in a ﬁne-grain manner during
sharing. When an app clearly knows (by analyzing the market and its business
models, oﬄine checking tools and anti-virus software) the interested apps to share
and certain apps to isolate, the system will not be able to grant such client app-
speciﬁc access and communication paths. Meanwhile an app is provably not able
to defend signature obfuscation techniques [11] without system intervention. It
is worth mentioning that since current Android is strongly lacking support for
third-party anti-virus apps/software [5], oﬄine anti-virus check with reconﬁgured
permissions (grant anti-virus app root privilege) can be a much more eﬀective
approach. To oﬀ-load this huge real-time/real-world scanning work on Google
Play or other app market vendors (not to mention some of them are not reli-
able/benign) is impossible, it is more practical for an individual app development
company to run the process within its interested sharing parties. We discuss this
in detail in section 6.
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On the optimistic side of Android’s appiﬁcation structure, Android is designed
for apps to share functionalities. However, it is almost impossible to pair apps
and share concurrently through inter-app ICCs in a scalable way. Based on the
incredible growth in the number of apps, increased memory capacity on hardware,
and the newest Android’s split screen feature, we can only foresee that the de-
mand/requirement for scalability will be signiﬁcantly increased. Concurrent app
sharing has been a rather new topic and there has been research work on the con-
text analysis for coordinated scheduling on sensor devices [44]. Similar frameworks
have been seen on a larger sensor-rich platform [52]. Although these works ad-
vance system support for sharing, there is almost no measure taken at the system
level in preventing or mitigating certain vulnerabilities like covert channels [74].
Also none of these works extend to third-party libraries that have been heavily
used, decentralized in nature and most attack-prone. Tackling with third-party
library security and privacy issues has been among the most challenging in the
Android security community [5] [76] due to Android’s lack of privilege separation
policy within an app.
Many tricky and unsolved security issues in Android should be the results
of a lack of centralized system support, meanwhile the performance enhancing
work is relying on system centralization. It is intuitive to suggest that in order to
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improve application concurrency and performance without compromising security,
wise system centralization mechanism is the key.
4.2 Design: Application Driven Access Control
Android system has been recently seen a shift to the dynamic and ﬁne-grained
permission control. It is already possible for developers to deﬁne custom permis-
sions that can grant access to their app’s functionality to other apps written by
the same developer, system apps, or all apps installed on the device. However, al-
though this mechanism improves the sharing realm among apps, it is still holding
two factors that hinder the deeper and cleaner sharing.
First, applications require the same functionalities are more likely to be in
direct competition. It is misleading and naive to assume that an app is willing
to share features or computing results to all other installed apps (basically all
apps). To preserve this competition edge, an app may choose to share only among
its sister apps (written by the same developer or company) rather than sharing
towards a much unbounded base of apps. In this case, the beneﬁt of sharing is
much more limited. Even if an app wants to share to a grander but limited group
of apps beyond its own relatives, there currently exists no means for a third-party
app to identify another app’s true identity to enforce the desired permission grant.
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Second, from the receiver client app point of view, the service given by other
third party apps is ultimately decentralized - that unavoidably carries the (un-
deniable) security defect - malicious intentions including not conforming to the
communication protocol or aiming at privilege escalation attacks [23] through in-
terfaces/IPC (it is not easy to avoid these attacks since all components in an
app enjoys the same permission), or providing incorrect results or unwanted data
(tamper). Note that current Android OS does not provide central witness or
regulating.
To promote clean, safe and at-will sharing among applications, we propose
signature-based grouping (permission control). In this section, we discuss system
implications and opportunities in the case study of audio/ speech recognition (SR)
applications and libraries.
4.2.1 Background on Android Audio Applications
Audio recording and processing is among the most primary functions of a mo-
bile device. With the growing popularity for user voice control, speech recognition
applications have been developed and improved for fast computing needs and low
latency. Typical audio applications read audio ﬁles or streams from the audio
service of the device and use libraries of speech recognition algorithms to decode
and extract important information about the content.
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Several technical challenges have hindered the deployment of such applications
on mobile devices. The most diﬃcult of these is the computational requirements
of continuous speech recognition for a medium to large vocabulary scenario. The
need to minimize the size and power consumption for these devices leads to com-
promises in their hardware and operating system software that further restrict
their capabilities below what one might assume from their raw CPU speed [41].
Moreover, memory, storage capacity and bandwidth on mobile devices are also
very limited.
4.2.2 Speech Recognition Libraries
Automatic speech recognition (ASR) is broadly deﬁned as the translation of
spoken words, or an acoustic waveform containing speech, into a string of words
[59]. In modern ASR speech is modelled as a mixture of acoustic and language
properties [9]. The acoustic models attempt to move from audio samples of speech
to potential phonemes being spoken, and from these phonemes to possible words.
The language model provides the probability of a speciﬁc sequence of words
occurring given a particular form of speech such as news, lectures or conver-
sation. This is used in conjunction with the output by the acoustic model to
identify the spoken phrases which are most likely to be correct [59]. Constraining
the vocabulary of the model is used to increase the identiﬁcation rate for systems
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like telephone interfaces and controlling subsystems in a car [48]. Larger, yet
still constrained, models are used for tasks such as Internet search and calendar
management [78]. The advantages of such a system are that with a tightly de-
ﬁned language model recognition rates can be greatly increased. Constraining the
vocabulary can improve the accuracy between 50% and 80% [14].
Platform speed directly aﬀected our choice of a speech recognition system for
our work. The SPHINX speech recognizer of CMU [51] provides the acoustic as
well as the language models used for recognition. It is based on the Hidden Markov
Models (HMM). Though all the members of the SPHINX recognizer family have
well-developed programming interfaces, and are actively used by researchers in
ﬁelds such as spoken dialog systems and computer-assisted learning, we chose the
PocketSphinx [41] as our speech decoder which is particularly meant for embedded
platforms. It is a version of open-source Sphinx2 speech recognizer which is faster
than any other SR system.
4.3 Overview of Cashmere Architecture
We present a software platform design called Cashmere. Cashmere enables
Android system to concurrently run multiple audio/speech applications with im-
proved overall system eﬃciency, reducing computational overhead and major ma-
licious concerns. Cashmere’s key innovation in providing this central layer be-
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tween applications and computation libraries, is of signiﬁcance in transferring
vulnerability-prone app-to-app communications into safer app-to-system commu-
nications.
4.3.1 Library Paths Identiﬁcation
For continuous audio applications, the microphone service streams audio frames
from the mic to the application as they become available. This stream becomes
the seed data for repetitively computed audio processing operations within an
application. Initial-level audio processing operations, such as conﬁguration ini-
tialization and sampling, create derivative objects from the seed data. Other
processing operations then generate successive derivatives when decode sample
data, mark progress, get hypothesis or more feature-based operations.
Since the computing process basically is a library function call chain, we call
these call chains library paths. Comparing a set of audio and SR applications, we
observe the initial-level library paths are usually the same. This key observation
promotes the ﬁrst steps in computation sharing and concurrency. Since each
application’s library path can only diﬀer from another application at the beginning
of a library call, we deﬁne these bifurcations as branch points.
To provide structured sharing of paths, Cashmere exerts a layer between a
library call and the actual target library. This layer is a central platform that
100
Figure 4.1: The Cashmere Platform Architecture. Upon an application calling a lib function,
the call will be directed to the modiﬁed audio library extended with binder IPC client interface
to send lib call requests to Shared Lib Service. Shared Lib Service is a registered service served
as a transition channel between client apps and the Cashmere server application. Library
function table is the major component of the server application, it records previously
computed lib calls and will reply to future identical calls directly, only un-computed fresh lib
calls will be passed on to the original library. Note that the original audio SR lib, in our case
libpocketsphinx.so will be renamed so applications cannot directly call it upon and instead the
modiﬁed lib is named libpocketsphinx.so.
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receives library call requests from all running applications and dispatches accord-
ing function returns. Cashmere matches library calls with identical parameters,
reusing computation results to reduce computational redundancy. Cashmere and
applications establish server client relations. Leveraged on Android’s binder mech-
anism, a library call will be directed to Cashmere through binder IPC. The accord-
ing replies will also feed through binder handles. The architecture of Cashmere is
illustrated in ﬁgure 4.1.
Cashmere itself is designed as a registered binder service within Android Plat-
form but outside of Android kernel space. Figure 4.2 shows Cashmere’s relations
to the Android system.
Figure 4.2: Cashmere as a registered service through Service Manager provided by Android
platform. Cashmere is in Android user space.
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4.3.2 Computation Memorization and Management
Although automatic memorization [60] is not a new topic, there is still diﬃculty
and room for optimization. For instance, only pure functions, those whose output
is determined solely by their input arguments, can be memorized.
Besides, in our scenario, we also need to enable general access to the memorized
library call computations from diﬀerent apps. To allow this, an eﬃcient common
memory region is required.
We design a hash table to store the functions and computations. To correctly
maintain the matching table, procedures of write to and read from the shared
region must be carefully designed. Since there is no need to use a sorted map
while unordered map in C++ does not allow complex key format such as pair or
vector, we assign the function name as the entry key, while storing the value as a
vector of pairs with each pair containing a Boolean variable ready (set true if the
computation of the entry is completed) and a pair containing a vector of input
parameters and a vector of the according output parameters.
Upon receiving a function call, look up is performed by comparing the function
name ﬁrst, then compare the input parameters of the function against each pair
in the value entry. If a match is found, a read will be issued by simply returning
the output of the entry if the Boolean variable ready is true.
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Otherwise a new pair with the input parameters will be appended to the vector
(ready marked false), and the function call is forwarded to the original library.
Once the execution is ﬁnished, the output part of the pair will be updated from
the function computation and ready set true. Note that the above only works for
ﬂat function calls (whose parameters do not contain returns from other functions).
To allow memorization for nested calls, we introduce void pointers to represent
all parameter vectors. Such that a function return can be equally seen as normal
parameters by retrieving the region the pointer points to.
4.3.3 Application-Guided Grouping
Applications tend to be professionals in sharing users’ privacy, however, they
are not able to use their expertise where they can more wisely and ethically
collaborate - I/O devices and computation results. Our study of tracing general
interactions among the most used mobile applications has found out that resource
contentions have been a major kill in performance and energy-eﬃciency.
We propose application-guided grouping, supervised by Cashmere within An-
droid OS. The central platform is equipped with the partition ability based on
each application’s collaboration interest by initializing and updating group match-
ing table entries during an application’s ﬁrst invocation of the library. Note that
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apps can be in the same group only when in direct or indirect mutual agreement
(trust), the details will be discussed in section 5.
4.3.4 Concurrent I/O
Conventional sharing is discussed on the basis of context switch, while in our
terms we deﬁne it as an altruistic behavior. A lot of work has been discussing
improving concurrent I/O application performance [39][42][13]. However, their
focus is on paralleling the I/O access within a single application while do not see
the missed opportunity of more concurrency among multiple applications.
Our intuition is that if improving parallelism and concurrency within a sin-
gle application can improve its performance, it will be similarly beneﬁcial to the
overall system performance if we improve the concurrency by solving resource
contention across application boundaries. Although the idea seems promising, it
exerts a diﬃcult problem as secure isolation standards among applications are
usually signiﬁcantly higher than within one application itself (among its compo-
nents). The key insight behind our proposed technique is that the vast majority of
applications are not malicious (The signature signing party performs checks and
Google Play as well normally will remove malicious apps within a short period
of time) and they can be scanned and reversed engineered oﬄine for anomaly
detection. Also considering there has been established trust among many appli-
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cations for functionality sharing through APIs, it is reasonable to form groups
for mutually trusted applications, thus extending the per-application boundary to
group-based boundary.
One could argue that such mechanism will create unfairness by beneﬁting more
to the applications in a large group and create disadvantage towards more isolated
applications. However, the evaluation results indicate quite the contrary. Even if
there is unfairness in computations without system intervention, we can solve this
by strategically promoting the groups containing foreground running app(s) (be it
multi-app group or single app-group), that is, for inter-group applications, we use
non-cooperative method, the groups of applications that seem more important to
the user will be promoted. Thus it is a reasonable strategy because it is user-
guided and user-friendly. Note that the absolute fairness perceived by the system
may not be demanded by users.
Also if an application is isolated, even if it cannot beneﬁt from obvious perfor-
mance gains, it may either purposely chooses to sacriﬁce performance advantage
for security reasons or be oﬀered such luxury of lower leakage risks without com-
promising performance.
Note that once the group formation is determined, it will be memorized by the
system. No further negotiations will be needed among applications in the same
group should the user starts running a subset of the same group again.
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To illustrate of the usefulness of concurrency through cooperation, consider a
scenario where a user wants to voice order food through restaurant apps and share
this information during audio chatting with friends. He is probably running several
restaurant software in the front while he wants to share these apps’ information in
real-time to his friends and family who by the chance are using three diﬀerent apps
to communicate with him (which isn’t rare considering the amount of diﬀerent
social network apps we have). Rather than rotating the usage of the CPU and
audio I/O among these software, if the applications are in the same group, they
can share I/O data and subsequent computations. This greatly eliminates context
switch cost and computing resources, and both the front and background software
can get real-time audio information constantly (responsiveness is important in
communications). This greatly increases the convenience to the background apps
that are usually less favored and thus only get occasional audio data or even no
data in the original Android environment.
4.4 Implementation
4.4.1 Two-Phase Grouping
Out of both security and performance concerns, we design a two-phase group-
ing. Phase One deﬁnes the primary boundaries among non-trusted parties. We
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require each application to provide grouping information, e.g. the list of trusted
application IDs. Since every Android app has a unique application ID, this ID
can uniquely identify the app on the device and in Google Play. However, con-
sidering the large base of application collections, we also provide options for only
specifying non-trusted applications, or delegating grouping obligation to a subset
of other applications (meaning the app will use the same list as its representative)
or simply use system default. Note that based on the fact that most malicious
apps in Google Play can be cleaned up in a short period [31], we can design sys-
tem default based on popular anomaly detection tool (RiskRanker [31]) and the
existence length of an app (the longer it has been in Google Play and since its
last update, the less the risk.). In this paper, we will not extend the discussion
on anomaly detection and system default.
Phase Two further divides group members based on vocabulary dictionary
similarities. As we mentioned, in speech recognition services, constraining the
vocabulary of the model is used to increase the identiﬁcation rate for systems.
Thus one application’s vocabulary corpus can be dramatically diﬀerent from one
another and using uniform speech models will kill precision and accuracy, and
might incur signiﬁcant delays due to the potentially enlarged model. However, if
each application uses their own models there will be limited room for computation
sharing. It is crucial for Cashmere system to deﬁne the boundaries of similarity,
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and to rebuild models for each subgroup. Note that all members within the
same group still share the audio record resources and pre-processing procedures
regardless of subgroup boundaries.
To accurately categorize subgroup interests, we use information retrieval tech-
niques to rank the closeness to a subgroup should a new app be added to the
group. The primary information we use is the text corpus collection of both the
subgroups and the new member app. During our evaluation, we ﬁnd out that the
word error rate is beyond linear to the size of the dictionary. It suggests that
groups with smaller vocabulary should beneﬁt more from grouping by sacriﬁcing
less in accuracy. The indication creates very subtle trade-oﬀs in grouping since
it basically implies that when looking at the overall platform performance and
accuracy, it is more advantageous to add the new app into a group with smaller
vocabulary size than into the ones with larger sizes when the vocabulary increase
caused by the new app is similar in both cases.
Additionally, since the number of applications and groups are not ﬁxed from
the beginning of sub-grouping and is primarily restrained by the platform compu-
tation capacity, the straight forward k -means clustering algorithm [49] of simply
repeatedly computing new centroids of k groups will not work properly and will be
very ineﬃcient. Especially in the scenario when only a small number of applica-
tions needs to run concurrently, the expansion to a comparatively large number k
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is unnecessary. On the other hand, although increasing k (the number of groups)
may be friendly towards recognition accuracy, each increase of a new group might
result in signiﬁcantly increased latency as well.
Due to the dynamic nature of k in our case, we have to adapt the clustering
algorithm based on the platform computation performance we collect and thus
determine the maximum number of groups allowed and the appropriate point of
regrouping or generating new groups. The subgrouping algorithm is illustrated in
Algorithm 1.
The present standard index for ASR system assessment is WER, which is
deﬁned as the proportion of word errors to words processed. Let N, S, D and I
denote the total number of reference words, substitutions, deletions and insertions
(see Equation.1). In Connected Speech Recognition, WER is deﬁned [12] as
WER =
S +D + I
N
(4.1)
We compute the overall temporarily increased WER upon app joining for each
sub group, so the lowest of all will be selected as the candidate group. We use
the temporarily updated WER of the candidate group to guide regrouping. If
the updated WER is below the default WER limit, then the candidate group is
accepted for the app to join. If the WER is above the limit but the maximum
number of subgroups is below the count limit, we can rely on k-means clustering, in
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the hope that total regrouping will help decreasing overall WER given k (subgroup
count) is increased by one.
We compare the corpus ﬁle of the new app to the corpus ﬁle of each sub
group. Upon joining the subgroup, the subgroup’s corpus ﬁle will be updated
combining the new app’s corpus information. The updated corpus ﬁle will then
be fed into Sphinx lmtool [70] to generate a new dictionary model accordingly.
For this reason, we require that each app provides their original corpus ﬁle along
with the app, either locally or though web access (remained as future work).
4.4.2 Inner-Group Isolation
Due to performance and user interests concerns, we assign the foreground app
as the leader app of the group. The leader app will always have its own extra
copy of data inaccessible by other members, thus that even a malicious member
will not be able to manipulate the leader’s original data. And if there exists a
malicious app modifying the shared data for damage purposes, the group always
has the original copy to reset with.
4.4.3 Inter-Group Isolation
We are very conservative in designing inter-group isolation for the purpose of
keeping data leak risk at the lowest among applications that have no foundation of
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Algorithm 1: Sub-grouping algorithm.
Given: Groups G, WER(dictSize), App A
foreach g ∈ G do
g.tmpWER ← WER( combineDict(g, A) )
g.ΔWER ← g.numOfApps × (g.tmpWER - g.WER) + g.tmpWER -
A.WER
end
sort g ∈ G with g.ΔWER in ascending order;
foreach g ∈ G do
if g.tmpWER ≤ WERLimit then
return g
end
end
if G.cnt ¡ groupCntLimit then
run KMeansClustering(G.cnt+1, G, A)
else
return ﬁrst g ∈ G
end
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trust. There is no sharing of computing results nor even the seed data. Since An-
droid adopts Linux’s UID permission system and there has been extensive research
in refraining or sandboxing untrusted third- party applications’ aggressive/sneaky
access to other apps or the user’s data [95][93], we assume applications of diﬀerent
groups have no knowledge or execution power of other groups’ data given there is
no direct inter group communications and the OS is not corrupted.
In our Cashmere source code, we initialize separate function lookup tables to
the exact amount of maximum groups allowed rather than initializing a single big
table using the groupID as the ﬁrst-layer entry key.
Since the maximum concurrent ASR apps in normal scenario is below hundreds
on a device, for safety concerns we design separate vectors storing appIDs for each
group rather than using the appID as a hash key. Upon receiving a function call
request, the appID will be compared against each element in each vector of the
groups. If there is a match, then the app is allowed access to the memorized
function layer where the group’s data is stored. The search time is still constant
due to the minimum number of apps.
If there exists no groupID for the app, Cashmere starts group forming based
on the grouping information the app provides and the group’s collaboration pref-
erence. Thus there is strong isolation among diﬀerent group’s data and computa-
tion.
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4.5 Evaluation
We evaluate Cashmere implementation in an Android emulator with instance
setting as Lollipop version 5.4, hardware Nexus 5x hexa-core Cortex-A57. In
addition to our case study utility, we design a set of micro benchmark apps to
characterize the actual performance of our platform. As we focus on the perfor-
mance side among applications, we extensively examine the varied latencies and
show how our approach bypass the bottlenecks. Note that since Lollipop does not
support split screen (multiple foreground apps), we design most benchmark apps
as background services in order to create and characterize concurrent running
scenarios.
Our evaluation addresses the following research questions:
RQ1 How does Cashmere compare to commercial mobile environment in terms
of latency in concurrent application computation?
RQ2 How do various optimizations and groupings aﬀect performance and se-
curity of applications running on Cashmere?
RQ3 Can sub-grouping lower recognition WER in the presence of multiple
speech applications of diﬀerent functionalities and to what degree?
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4.5.1 Library Call Indirection Overhead
We microbenchmark a major ps decode() library call on a one sentence audio
record using the original vocabulary model. The computationally intensive decode
library call takes 1.71 s, exhibiting the potential beneﬁts of caching expensive
library calls. We do a single-call analysis on our microbenchmarks by averaging
10 instances of library calls. Cashmere introduces a minimal overhead (memory
allocation and redirection) of as much as 12.8 ms per call, yielding overhead to
0.75% for expensive calls.
4.5.2 Dictionary Model Inﬂuence in Latency and Accu-
racy
We also proceed the experiment with a more constrained dictionary model
(with the minimum vocabulary corpus needed for the scenario of 10 words), and it
takes 350 ms. It shows the drastic impacts diﬀerent vocabulary models can exert.
However, even in such low latency calls, Cashmere only adds 3.7% overhead. Note
that the recognition accuracy is 100% under this extremely tailored scenario. To
characterize the the relation of WER to the vocabulary dictionary size, we increase
the dictionary size on varying granularities and repeat the experiment. Figure 4.3
and 4.4 show the relationship of WER to dictionary size and latency to dictionary
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size respectively. WER increases nearly linearly (less than exponential) to the
word counts in a vocabulary dictionary. When the word count is smaller than
20000, WER is below 2%, which is highly acceptable. However, WER tends to
increase faster when word count exceeds 80000. The reason behind is that the
more word counts, the less diﬀerence between recognition candidates and the more
error-prone combinations of words. In contrast, average latency is nearly linear
to word count while scales even better. This is due to the audio pre-processing
time and other application system communication cost.
Figure 4.3: Average WER to varied vocabulary dictionary sizes on PocketSphinx.
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Figure 4.4: Average latency to varied vocabulary dictionary sizes.
4.5.3 Concurrent Apps Performance
We next analyze the ability of Cashmere to service concurrent Apps. We em-
ploy fundamental audio tasks as benchmarks to examine the beneﬁts and overhead
of Cashmere on Apps.
We use audio tasks of Voice Recording and Speech Recognition. Apps employ
these audio tasks to perform a diverse set of duties. These tasks comprehensively
cover the PocketSphinx library, and serve as a basis for many audio applications
that can potentially run concurrently. In our evaluation, each of our apps re-
ceives the audio stream through the Cashmere platform distribution. An app
sends the stream through each benchmark audio task, which begins by recording,
and read it to samples. We include these pre-processing steps in our evaluation
results. Speech recognition algorithms decode and identify speech contents in a
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Table 4.1: Applications with Dictionary Word Counts
Applications
Application DictWordCount (Average)
Restaurant 216
Airline 21350
Mini Health Assistant 1158
Advanced Health Assistant 69812
Direction 370
Search 31756
E-Commerce 14620
voice record, useful for applications such as social apps, gaming and vehicle GPS.
Speech recognition consists of two components: decode and classiﬁcation. The
Vertibi Search algorithm compares a computed distance against a cascade of pre-
trained classiﬁers. Speech classiﬁcation identiﬁes contents by matching against a
vocabulary dictionary and voice dataset. The nearest neighbor is determined to
be the content word.
Our benchmarks consist of two combinations of apps running audio tasks. In
a potential scenario, a mobile device would run simultaneous background appli-
cations running multiple audio tasks, e.g., logging social interactions with speech
recognition, recording speeches, directing locations. We selected and coded a set
of speech recognition tasks with a variety of duties (as shown in Table 4.1). The
vocabulary of each task is formed with either the guidance of the widely referred
speech dataset website Linguistic Data Consortium [66] and VoxForge [58] or open
sourced software.
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Figure 4.5: Average latency of concurrently running audio apps natively and in Cashmere.
As as can be seen from Figure 4.5, Cashmeres eﬃciency beneﬁts become ap-
parent when running multiple identical speech recognition audio tasks. While
native processing time is doubled when running two tasks on the original plat-
form, Cashmere manages to maintain the increased processing time within 19.0%
of the original frame processing time. This reduces the per-frame processing time
of running two audio task instances by 41.9%. The advantage is even more sub-
stantial when running more than 5 instances where the latency of the original
platform has strongly exceeded the limit of human tolerable latency of 1s [62]
while Cashmere stands ﬁrmly within. Combinations of applications with diﬀerent
categories also beneﬁt from Cashmere eﬃciency. Through sharing the decode()
library call on the input frame, Cashmere decreases the processing time of the
combination of voice recording and speech recognition by 11.2%.
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Thus, Cashmere provides app scalability, as many apps can run with minimally
impacted frame rate performance.
4.5.4 Grouping Overhead and Impact
Grouping happens exactly the very ﬁrst time an app calls the library. We
measure grouping overhead by averaging 2 to 15 apps grouping overhead. The
overhead is 0.033 ms, as an one time overhead per app joining, is minimum com-
pared to speech processing and recognition time.
Impact of Primary-grouping on Timing Channels
We consider the scenario when an app requires more security protection (e.g.
less induced timing channel), so it chooses to form a group owned only by itself.
From section 6.3 we know that if there are concurrently running groups (apps),
the latency will slow down for each concurrent entity. However, what kind of
apps (deﬁned and mostly inﬂuenced by dictionary size) will be inﬂuenced to what
degree under diﬀerent group formations is not clear. Since timing channels can
be quantiﬁed by latency variations [10], we run apps with small to medium (300
- 20000) and large (80000) dictionary models concurrently with additional 1 to
3 groups and compare the latency with its original latency. We use additional
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groups with average medium to large vocabularies considering the normal group
formation. To verify the eﬀectiveness of using primary grouping to mitigate timing
channels, we also compare the above results with the latency in the scenario when
the app simply joins another group.
Figure 4.6: Average latency of running an app with small to medium vocabulary sizes
without concurrent apps, running exclusively but concurrently with additional groups, and
running non-exclusively but concurrently by joining one of the additional groups in Cashmere.
From Figure 4.6 we can see that apps with small and medium dictionary
sizes are only inﬂuenced minimally when running exclusively. In contrast, with-
out grouping, their latency increases signiﬁcantly due to usually dramatically
increased combined dictionary size of a group. That means that by running ex-
clusively, the timing channel created by diﬀerences in latency is signiﬁcantly alle-
viated. Apps with large dictionary sizes (Figure 4.7) seems not beneﬁt by running
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Figure 4.7: Average latency of running an app with large vocabulary sizes without
concurrent apps, running exclusively but concurrently with additional groups, and running
non-exclusively but concurrently by joining one of the additional groups in Cashmere.
exclusively from the timing channel alleviation perspective. However, one reason
is that we run concurrent groups with medium to large vocabularies, which is
rather conservative. One can imagine that if we use much larger dictionaries
(above 100000, which is not unusual) for the additional groups, the exclusively
running app can beneﬁt as well similar to the ﬁrst small/medium app scenario.
Also note that although timing channels are one of the major concerns in
security issues, an app can potentially beneﬁt from forming an exclusive group
by owning its own computations and memories. Usually it is less likely to be
corrupted by techniques like stack overﬂow that might target the library’s own
vulnerabilities. Note that the fact that apps with small and medium vocabulary
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sizes can beneﬁt well with security is suﬃciently useful since security-sensitive apps
are normally word restrictive, e.g. ﬁnancial apps. Besides, from a performance
perspective, adding a few new exclusive groups with small/medium dictionaries
has only minimum to moderate impact on overall system performance. On the
other hand, since it is relatively performance unfriendly for an app with a large
dictionary to start a new exclusive group, if not for security reasons, an app should
be inclined towards joining a current group. Also note that the diﬀerence between
an app running exclusively and simply running without Cashmere with its own
compiled library is the ﬂexibility of forming its own group, and it will be beneﬁcial
with future potential collaborators. The evaluation is to show the trade-oﬀ in
forming a new group beyond the scenario of simply exclusively running.
On another note, we experimentally conﬁrmed that an app requiring primary
grouping for its own partition will not change its WER from original. This sup-
ports the ﬂexibility of action when an app determines performance, security and
WER trade-oﬀs.
Sub-grouping Performance
In order to characterize the inﬂuence of sub-grouping based on vocabulary sim-
ilarities. We conduct three combinations of diﬀerent scenarios. The ﬁrst scenario
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is for restaurant apps with voice commands. We select major inter chain pizza
restaurants and port their menu into sentence corpus respectively. The corpus ﬁles
are then extracted to generate dictionary models accordingly. Using prerecorded
audio ﬁles, the original latency were measured as 207 ms. To evaluate the eﬃ-
ciency of sub-grouping, we run the four apps concurrently on Cashmere. Cashmere
will extract the corpus ﬁles and generate a model covering all the vocabularies of
the four and thus the model can be shared. The latency of concurrently running
four apps is shown in Figure 4.8. The second scenario is targeting more profound
speech recognition usage (personal assistant, searching, etc) that requires a sig-
niﬁcantly broader vocabulary, we use both the minimum and advanced health
assistant applications. This scenario also represents the sub-grouping formation
of apps with similar functionality but signiﬁcantly diﬀerent vocabulary sizes. The
third scenario is the combination of all the apps and their sister apps listed in
Table 4.1.
We test if Cashmere can perform desired sub-grouping and the latency is listed
in Figure 4.8. For restaurant apps in scenario 1, the dictionary of each app is very
small and has major overlaps. Simply to divide the apps into more groups will
only create new computations that sharply increases latency without noticeable
beneﬁt from nearly identical separate dictionaries. For health assistant apps in
scenario 2, since the category contains both minimum and advanced dictionary
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Figure 4.8: Average latency of concurrently running diﬀerent combinations of apps in
Cashmere.
models, when sub-grouping happens, the minimum apps can form a new group
that only adds a fraction of burden to the original computation. The third sce-
nario reveals the fact that latency scale better than linear throughout diﬀerent sub
group formations for even very diverse apps. The reason is that the divided dictio-
naries tend to be signiﬁcantly smaller than combined, the more sub groups formed,
the more sharply decreased average dictionary sizes. Although our sub-grouping
algorithm targets WER, it directly boosts intelligent dividing of dictionaries as
well. We also stress test the limit of the number and formation of apps that Cash-
mere can sustain. It turns out that Cashmere can support 15 concurrent apps
with diﬀerent functionalities and dictionary models, which is far beyond the capa-
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bility of the original Android commercial environment without relying on a server.
How does sub-grouping improve recognition accuracy
Since the main reason of sub-grouping is to increase accuracy of the recognizer.
We evaluate the average WER for each category of apps listed in Table 1 with sub-
grouping formation in the third scenario. Note that number of subgroup equaling
to 1 represents no sub-grouping. We ﬁndWER decreases signiﬁcantly when proper
formation of sub-grouping is allowed as shown in Figure 4.9. We adjust param-
eters in the sub-grouping algorithms to allow diﬀerent sub-grouping formations.
As seen from the results, without sub-grouping (number of sub groups is 1), all
apps have to share the full combination of all vocabularies, which is mounted to
approximately 156,000, yielding very bad WER for all apps. When two sub groups
are formed, the largest dict category – advanced health assistants is excluded to
a new group. Thus the health assistant apps and the rest both have cut-to-half
dict sizes, which leads to dramatically decreased WER. Similarly, when four sub
groups are formed, the formation is nearly ideal since the resulted WER for each
app is very close to the original WER for each app without sharing dictionaries
with other apps. Notably, sub-grouping is very eﬃcient in lowering WER (im-
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proving recognition accuracy) and is essential in compensating the accuracy loss
during computation sharing.
Figure 4.9: Average WER to varied vocabulary dictionary sizes.
4.5.5 Security Analysis
Our system can ensure individual application’s library grouping privacy policy
enforcement on Android device through dynamic binding.
Malicious apps. Cashmere allows device users to install their favorite apps on
their Android smartphones. Some apps may be malicious and target at compro-
mising our policy enforcement mechanism. However, since the user-level malicious
processes are securely isolated into separate group containers, they cannot manip-
ulate the code or the control ﬂow of cashmere unless they have the root privilege.
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We assume the Android OS can be trusted. Therefore, without the root privilege,
malicious apps cannot compromise our mechanism.
Permission escalation attacks. Android system may suﬀer from permission es-
calation attacks, such as confused deputy attack and collusion attack[15][25]. In
confused deputy attack, a malicious application exploits the vulnerable interfaces
of another privileged (but confused) application to perform unauthorized opera-
tions. This kind of attack usually happens when a privileged app unintentionally
exposes interfaces of sensitive operation to an app without required permissions.
We have considered this attack during the design of guideline of grouping - when
selecting grouping members, it is recommended to check candidate member’s in-
terface as strict as one’s own interface to allow collaborations, this interface check
can be achieved using reverse engineering and normal anti-virus software, such as
AVG Antivirus Free, Lookout Security Antivirus, Norton Mobile Security Lite,
etc. Since we design grouping to be a two-way agreement, it’s reasonable to an-
ticipate that the interface security of a group is not dramatically diﬀerent from
individual member apps alone. Meaning, even without grouping, the individual
app’s interface security is likely to be similar to its group’s lowest.
In collusion attacks, malicious apps collude and combine their permissions in
order to perform actions beyond their individual privileges.
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Our platform defends this kind of attack through ﬁne-grained low-level control.
Permission is not able to be combined simply by primary grouping since our
mechanism does not change permission in setgroups in Process Creation Request
directly, thus grouping is on library service level rather than system level like (e.g.
an app without 1007 CAMERA permission is not allowed to access camera even
it is in a group where a group member is actively accessing camera). We carefully
design the control level to as low level as possible to not to be confused with
system permission.
4.6 Conclusions
Application concurrency has become the primary need of a mobile system.
However, I/O and sensor related computation is usually expensive and is in di-
rect conﬂict with the limited computation resources. Speciﬁcally on Android, its
decentralized nature is another obstacle from applications’ safe sharing of compu-
tation. By exploring the possibility of centralization, our proposed application-
centric platform Cashmere is able to eﬃciently isolate applications based on each
application’s interests and saves computation by memorizing library calls within
the group boundary. In dealing with applications using computation exhaustive
speech recognition libraries, subgrouping (grouping based on vocabulary similar-
ities) is further useful in improving and balancing latency and accuracy. The
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concept can potentially be extended to other I/O areas. Although in this pa-
per we assume PocketSphinx a benign library, the collaborate primary grouping
approach proposed in the paper is promising in solving the third party library
sharing problem that is widely considered one of the most challenging in the An-
droid security community. Future investigations into how to radically eliminate
timing channels among groups is also a valuable topic.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
We conclude this dissertation by summarizing our key contributions and dis-
cussing the utility and trade-oﬀs in hardware and software sharing patterns.
Sharing for eﬃciency is one of the most common tricks in the computing
system designers “handbook”. Sharing through a traditional strict time division
(e.g. via predetermined context switches) can be almost universally applied when
multiple entities are supposed to utilize common resources. However, such strict
time division is subject to signiﬁcant performance degradation.
As noted by Menychtas et al. [61] the goals of protection, eﬃciency, and fair-
ness can often be in direct conﬂict. Indeed, as more freedom is introduced into the
schedule, more issues of protection arise. Timing channels are inevitably intro-
duced because of contention on resources. These timing diﬀerences can introduce
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both opportunities for denial-of-service attacks and more subtle leakage such as
those that target cache and crypto-graphic engines to retrieve secret data. Under
static sharing, e.g. using pre-deﬁned static scheduling algorithms, the timing usage
of any entity is strictly bounded and unaﬀected by other parties, thus eliminating
timing channels. The diﬃculty is that there is no universal static schemes one can
apply to any component that also provide performances. As such they require a
deeper examination of the particular component and often demand optimizations
to avoid other overhead (additional area, etc).
Across the three diﬀerent systems examined, the network-on-chip, the acceler-
ators, and the operating systems sharing scheme, we ﬁnd diﬀerent sharing patterns
with a common theme. While schemes closer to the hardware can be more care-
fully scheduled to hide latency it is diﬃcult to carry those ideas up the software
stack where timing is less easy to control. However, careful static coordination of
the sharing parties is still useful. At the software level this can instead manifest
as collaboration groups.
5.1 Contributions
For hardware level sharing, the scalability increase usually comes from the
hardware architecture design itself and has little to do with the properties of the
concurrent tasks running on them. From the lessons of our successful design of
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SurfNoC, we learn that to be able to defend timing channels, static schemes might
have far less overhead than previously believed when latency is taken as a ﬁrst
class design constraint. In the case of hardware accelerators the key insight is to
allow ﬂexibility in being static or approaching static. Flexibility is important since
security has to be balanced with performance. Traditional methods of sharing on
accelerators are through full context switches, and for simplicity, one often chooses
to drop tasks or wait for an unﬁnished task to ﬁnish. The former is detrimental to
performance if ﬁne-grained sharing is required, and the latter is subject to more
timing leaks. By chopping states at the optimal points along a computation, and
by providing a minimum interface to the software, an accelerator architecture
can be granted the capability to locally determine the best time to switch. Thus
a pre-deﬁned switching frequency, that shields timing leaks, is unlikely to incur
more than the minimum performance overhead. Although the veriﬁcation and
quantiﬁcation of actual timing information leaks are not evaluated in this thesis,
we can conclude from our current characterizations that ﬂexibility of sharing is
guaranteed and that the design is at least as secure has having multiple interfaces.
By comparing to the veriﬁed timing channel-free SurfNoC, we know that if the
number of sharing domains is pre-determined, then the waiting time and latency
can be ﬁxed. This can also be applied to the sharing scheme proposed in this
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thesis, and because of its low context switch overhead, it can endure as many
domains as the system requires, which is unlikely with traditional context switch.
Building from this success we were also very curious to ﬁnd out if the patterns
can be applied in scaling software as well. However, due to the more dynamic na-
ture of software systems, applying static scheduling when the number and prop-
erties of entities are unknown is unwise. We were inspired by the cooperative
distributed systems algorithm and thought that the spirit of that work could be
extended to elsewhere in systems. We also wanted to push the work toward a
more commodity application space so, in choosing a software operating system
to work with, we target one that requires concurrency improvement and is under
diﬃcult security concerns, which makes Android a perfect candidate.
Fortunately, Android is already on a path that leads toward application col-
laboration, however, until now, it is still deeply trapped in numerous diﬀerent
attacks and privacy leaks from malicious applications. Even anti-virus software
(third-party apps) have no privilege on Android which makes them essentially
useless. Flow-tracking software can consume a signiﬁcant amount of energy and
is simply not realistic on many devices. In such a vulnerable state, any software
applications that suﬀer from attack once or more will reasonably consider closing
collaboration channels (ICCs), which are the source of many problems. On the
other hand Android applications are also demanding more concurrency, e.g. the
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newest version features split screen for multiple foreground apps. Without volun-
tary acts in collaborations nor a feasible static sharing scheme, how can Android
improve computation concurrency?
By looking into ASR apps, we propose two key techniques – a central service
platform and an application-centric grouping. The details of both techniques
have already been well explained in the thesis. Although it is studied through
a speech recognition library, it has general indications to other I/O libraries,
and concurrent I/O designs. But beyond that, it also has potential in dealing
with third-party library and third-party application sharing ultimately. This is
a very hard problem due to Android’s one permission for all, the whole app can
be corrupted by a un-veriﬁed third-party app or library. By being central, rather
than verifying (time-consuming) and storing (memory-consuming) identical third-
party libraries, the veriﬁcation and sharing work all come to one point of control.
Note that if the multiple version and upgrade issues of a library can be dealt with,
it will attract even more applications to collaborate.
5.2 Looking Forward
While this work demonstrates the power of coordinated sharing to strike a
balance between security and performance, the universal pattern of developing
static approaches for even hardware systems are still not addressed in this thesis.
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For software systems the patterns might be too complicated to be generalized. An
emerging scheme for sharing is through collaborations and we see a great deal of
space for future work here. This is by no means a new topic, the cooperative and
non-cooperative game theories have been well studied and applied in Economics
and Computer Science. Nash equilibrium is discussed during the design for the
famous distributed system algorithms for fault-tolerance. However, these and
other intelligent theories are still not widely applied. When the options are very
limited because we are busy defending attacks while simultaneously trying to scale
performance, it can be diﬃcult to invest the time to see if these more fundamental
approaches could shift the problem signiﬁcantly.
The work presented here is a step towards new sharing patterns for both
computation concurrency and security. The proposed collaboration pattern can
be seen as between hardware and software, and between software applications who
are supposed to be competitors. While Android has already done wonderful work
in promoting collaborations among applications through interfaces and function
calls, the ﬂood of malicious acts has given us an important lesson. We must
amend or reform the sharing pattern in software and operating systems. We
should also carry this lesson down to accelerator rich platforms where similar
sharing approaches are developing to avoid repeating the same mistakes there.
136
Application-centric grouping is only a tip of an iceberg of new patterns for safe
and high performance sharing that we believe will be an important and continuing
conversation by the community going forward. Many software sub-systems are in
competition as they are controlled by diﬀerent sets of stake holders, but they
are also subject to limited resources – this is the typical game theory pattern.
Looking forward we think the study of game theory might give further insight on
the design of future platforms. At the simplest, each application can deﬁne its
sharing realm with even hierarchies. As we get more advanced, applications might
delegate work to other representatives (an authority app it trusts or an anti-virus
app that is not favored by the system but might help). Beyond that, the sharing
is not limited to computation concurrency, it can cover more general sharing of
functionality including for security or for storage. It might not be conﬁned within
Android, nor within operating system. The usage is only natural, the Android
ecosystem is just like a society. Without collaborations, how can one go far?
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